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WHO TELLS THEIR STORIES?:  EXAMINING THE 
ROLE, DUTIES, AND ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS OF 
THE VICTIM’S ATTORNEY UNDER  
MODEL RULE 3.6 
Ksenia Matthews* 
 
In U.S. criminal proceedings, the prosecution typically presents the 
victim’s story.  However, as part of the victims’ rights movement, victims are 
striving to make their voices heard and tell their stories in their own words.  
Yet, despite the growing role victims occupy in criminal proceedings and the 
rights afforded to victims by the Crime Victims’ Rights Act and its state 
counterparts, victims still remain nonparties in criminal proceedings. 
As victims increasingly retain private lawyers to help navigate criminal 
proceedings and represent their interests, it is important to understand how 
these lawyers fall within the traditional two-party adversary system.  Limited 
by the current criminal process, one way that victims’ lawyers might help 
protect their clients’ interests is by engaging in extrajudicial commentary.  
Model Rule 3.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct—the ethics rule 
governing trial publicity—restricts materially prejudicial statements made 
by participating trial lawyers.  This Note examines the application of Model 
Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers, looking to the text of the model rule and its 
purposes.  After finding Model Rule 3.6’s text ambiguous, this Note argues 
that policy concerns guiding the victims’ rights movement and related laws 
protecting victims’ interests outweigh the justifications for Model Rule 3.6’s 
strictures.  Ultimately, this Note argues that Model Rule 3.6 should not apply 
to victims’ lawyers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A year after Jeffrey Epstein was charged with sex trafficking conspiracy 
and sex trafficking underage individuals,1 Ghislaine Maxwell—his former 
girlfriend and alleged partner in the conspiracy—was arrested outside her 
New Hampshire residence, after fleeing from authorities.2  Maxwell was 
initially indicted on six counts, stemming from her role “in the sexual 
exploitation and abuse of multiple minor girls” by Epstein,3 but less than a 
year later, two more counts were added, alleging, among other charges, sex 
trafficking conspiracy and sex trafficking of a minor.4 
Given the defendants’ celebrity status, the cases garnered significant 
media attention.5  The victims retained counsel, who spoke at length to the 
press.6  In response to these public comments, Maxwell’s lawyers requested 
an order prohibiting prosecutors and counsel for witnesses—specifically 
counsel for the victims—from making extrajudicial statements,7 pursuant to 
Local Criminal Rule 23.1 of the United States District Courts for the 
Southern and Eastern Districts of New York (“Rule 23.1”).8 
In denying Maxwell’s motion for a gag order, Judge Alison J. Nathan 
stated that the court expected that “counsel for all involved parties” would 
comply with the court’s local rules and with the rules of professional 
responsibility.9  Still, the order left open the question of whether victims’ 
 
 1. See Sealed Indictment at 1, 11–12, United States v. Epstein, No. 19-cr-00490 
(S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2019). 
 2. See Nicole Hong et al., Ghislaine Maxwell, Associate of Jeffrey Epstein, Is Arrested, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/02/nyregion/ghislaine-
maxwell-arrest-jeffrey-epstein.html [https://perma.cc/6JKU-UWB3]. 
 3. Sealed Indictment at 1, United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-cr-00330 (S.D.N.Y. June 
29, 2020).  The eighteen-page indictment focused particularly on three underage victims who 
were groomed by Maxwell. See generally id. at 5–9. 
 4. See Superseding Indictment at 17, 19, United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-cr-00330 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2021). 
 5. Jeffrey Epstein was linked to numerous high-profile celebrities and politicians. See 
Ali Watkins & Vivian Wang, Jeffrey Epstein Is Accused of Luring Girls to His Manhattan 
Mansion and Abusing Them, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/ 
07/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-sex-trafficking.html [https://perma.cc/B5RW-UC9F].  After 
Epstein was found dead in his prison cell as he awaited trial, federal prosecutors focused their 
attention on Maxwell. See Hong et al., supra note 2. 
 6. See Letter Motion at 3–6, United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-cr-00330 (S.D.N.Y. July 
21, 2020) (noting that the victims’ attorneys commented on the possibility of a plea deal, the 
defense’s potential strategy of blaming the victims and how that could backfire, and the 
victims’ impressions of Maxwell’s arrest and detention). 
 7. See id. at 1.  Such a “gag order” bars prejudicial commentary by trial participants. 
Eileen A. Minnefor, Looking for Fair Trials in the Information Age:  The Need for More 
Stringent Gag Orders Against Trial Participants, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 95, 119 (1995).  A gag 
order is geared toward potential future conduct and requires the court to consider and predict 
whether certain future statements are likely to prejudice a trial. See id. at 137. 
 8. See Letter Motion, supra note 6, at 1; S.D.N.Y. CRIM. R. 23.1.  Local Criminal Rule 
23.1 prohibits lawyers from releasing information or opinions in connection with pending 
criminal litigations with which they are associated when the release of the information or 
opinions would interfere with a fair trial. See S.D.N.Y. CRIM. R. 23.1(a). 
 9. Order, United States v. Maxwell, No. 20-cr-00330, slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 
2020). 
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attorneys were counsel for an involved party who must adhere to the same 
ethical standards as the defense and prosecution.10  Rule 23.1 prohibits 
statements “in connection with pending or imminent criminal litigation with 
which [the lawyer is] associated.”11  This emphasis on association leaves 
room for many lawyers to fall within the rule’s scope.  Yet, Judge Nathan did 
not penalize the victims’ attorneys for their public comments on the case, 
which possibly violated multiple subsections of Rule 23.1.12 
Although interpreting a local criminal rule, Judge Nathan’s emphasis on 
the rules of professional responsibility13 raises the question:  how should the 
American Bar Association’s (ABA) Model Rule 3.6 (“the Rule” or “Rule 
3.6”)—the rule governing trial publicity—apply to victims’ lawyers during 
criminal trials?14  Victims are often expected to be witnesses, but they are 
not parties to the case.15  But, in high profile cases like Maxwell’s, it is 
understandable why victims might want independent counsel to advocate and 
speak on their behalf.16  Indeed, at Maxwell’s pretrial detention hearing, it 
became clear that defense counsel would “mount a ‘blame the victim’ 
defense.”17  Yet, with little scholarship on how Rule 3.6 applies to victims’ 
lawyers, victims’ lawyers enter uncharted waters when seeking to adhere to 
the Rule’s ethical constraints while zealously advocating for their clients. 
Rule 3.6 applies to attorneys “participating . . . in the investigation or 
litigation of a matter” and restricts them from making materially prejudicial 
statements publicly.18  Victims, despite their nonparty status, have great 
interests in criminal proceedings and are increasingly retaining attorneys to 
 
 10. See id.  The order referenced “counsel for potential witnesses” but did not consider 
victims’ attorneys generally. Id. 
 11. S.D.N.Y. CRIM. R. 23.1(a). 
 12. See Letter Motion, supra note 6, at 5 (arguing that David Boies, the victim’s attorney, 
“offered his gratuitous critique of defense counsel, commented on the credibility of Ms. 
Maxwell . . . and commented on what Mr. Boies considers ‘evidence’ in this case, all in 
violation of subsections (1), (4), (6), and (7) of the Rule”). 
 13. See Maxwell, slip op. at 1. 
 14. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that trial participants’ communications during trial 
may be subject to restrictions. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1072–73 
(1991).  However, the Court has not addressed the constitutionality of a rule that regulates the 
statements of a lawyer who is not participating in the pending case. See id. at 1072 n.5.  This 
leaves open the question of who is a lawyer “participating in” a case. Id. 
 15. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 16. Victims generally have no control over how the prosecution and defense will tell their 
stories. See Lara Bazelon & Bruce A. Green, Victims’ Rights from a Restorative Perspective, 
17 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293, 317 (2020).  Yet, especially in a sexual assault case, a victim’s 
character and credibility are likely to come under tremendous scrutiny. See William T. Pizzi, 
Victims’ Rights:  Rethinking Our “Adversary System,” 1999 UTAH L. REV. 349, 355.  Thus, 
in a high publicity case where victims may expect defense counsel to engage in “victim 
blaming” publicly, victims may benefit from having independent counsel speak to the public 
on their behalf. See generally infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 17. Patricia Hurtado, Ghislaine Maxwell’s Attack-the-Victim Strategy May Backfire, BNN 
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2020), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/ghislaine-maxwell-may-play-
the-victim-card-in-trial-defense-1.1465631 [https://perma.cc/6MLL-344F] (quoting David 
Boies). 
 18. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added). 
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help protect those interests.19  However, it is not clear if victims’ lawyers are 
participants in a criminal proceeding when they speak on behalf of their 
clients, in light of their clients’ nonparty status.20  Thus, beyond the plain text 
of Rule 3.6 and the literal interpretations of “participation,” policy concerns 
arise both for and against its application to victims’ lawyers. 
This Note highlights arguments for both interpretations, considering:   
(1) the purposes of Rule 3.6 and the victims’ rights movement and subsequent 
legislation and (2) whether the two can be balanced in today’s criminal 
justice system.  As discussed in Part III, this Note argues that such a balance 
is difficult to strike, but that the goals of the growing victims’ rights 
movement ought to factor more heavily in considering the applicability of 
Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers.  Thus, to help realize the goals of the victims’ 
rights movement and victims’ rights legislation, this Note argues that Rule 
3.6 should not apply to victims’ lawyers. 
Part I of this Note examines the issue of pretrial publicity and how Rule 
3.6 seeks to address this concern.  It discusses the current use of extrajudicial 
statements by the prosecution and defense and the application of Rule 3.6.  
Part I also discusses the rise of the victims’ rights movement, the various 
rights afforded by the Crime Victims’ Rights Act21 (CVRA), and the reasons 
why victims retain independent lawyers who may choose to communicate 
extrajudicially.  Part II first considers whether, on its face, Rule 3.6 applies 
to victims’ lawyers, ultimately finding the text of the Rule ambiguous.  It 
then discusses the purposes behind Rule 3.6 and whether the purposes shed 
any light on its application to victims’ lawyers.  Lastly, Part II outlines the 
various policy concerns that drive the victims’ rights movement and related 
legislation, examining how such policies might affect the application of Rule 
3.6 to victims’ lawyers.  Part III argues that Rule 3.6, as it is currently written, 
should not be applied to victims’ lawyers in light of the procedural 
constraints on victims’ true participation in the trial and the underlying policy 
concerns of the victims’ rights movement. 
I.  THE MODEL RULE, THE TRIAL, AND THE VICTIM 
Pretrial publicity—and the threat that attorneys’ extrajudicial commentary 
may pose to a criminal trial—has long been a guiding concern behind Rule 
 
 19. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 20. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 21. Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2261, 2261–65 (2004) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 and 34 U.S.C.). 
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3.6.22  Given Rule 3.6’s emphasis on participating lawyers,23 it is evident that 
the Rule applies to the prosecution and defense.  Indeed, Rule 3.6 has served 
as a measure against extrajudicial commentary by prosecutors and defense 
attorneys.24 
In the last few decades, crime victims have begun to encompass a new role 
in the criminal trial—one that suggests victims may be participants.  As 
victims’ rights laws have been passed,25 victims have been granted the right 
to meet with prosecutors, object to plea bargaining, make sentencing 
statements, and receive restitution.26  Given these rights, a victim’s role 
during the trial has gone beyond one of a mere witness.27  Yet, it is unclear 
whether victims’ attorneys should be subject to Rule 3.6’s strictures, 
particularly in light of the importance of giving victims a voice. 
On the other hand, extrajudicial commentary may be particularly damning 
to the modern trial, especially given the growing role the media plays in court 
proceedings28 and the way such statements can be quickly disseminated—
making it more difficult to find jurors unaffected by the media’s framing of 
the case29 or to ensure a fair trial for the accused.30  Therefore, it is important 
to determine the victims’ lawyers’ role in the criminal trial by virtue of their 
unique clients and to determine whether the constraints of Rule 3.6 ought to 
apply to them as well. 
With this question in mind, Part I.A focuses on Rule 3.6, examining 
pretrial publicity in criminal cases and discussing how the Rule applies to 
different situations involving the principal parties to the trial:  the prosecution 
and the defense.  Part I.B then examines victims’ growing role in criminal 
trials and that role’s codification in victims’ rights legislation.  Finally, Part 
I.C considers why victims might increasingly retain counsel during criminal 
proceedings and how these attorneys might utilize extrajudicial commentary 
to advocate for their client. 
 
 22. See generally Meghan Levine, Note, The Competing Roles of an Attorney in a 
High-Profile Case:  Trying a Case Inside and Outside of the Courtroom, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 683, 685–93 (2015).  An in-depth examination of the history and jurisprudence 
concerning Rule 3.6 and pretrial publicity is beyond the scope of this Note.  For a detailed 
description of the history of limitations on pretrial publicity and the ABA’s attempts to curb 
such publicity, see Mattei Radu, The Difficult Task of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 
3.6:  Balancing the Free Speech Rights of Lawyers, the Sixth Amendment Rights of Criminal 
Defendants, and Society’s Right to the Fair Administration of Justice, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
497, 498–523 (2007). 
 23. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6. 
 24. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 25. See infra notes 101–05 and accompanying text. 
 26. See infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text; see also infra note 105. 
 27. See generally infra notes 115–19 and accompanying text. 
 28. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., The Media, Attorneys, and Fair Criminal Trials, 4 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1994). 
 29. See id. at 61–62. 
 30. See id. at 62. 
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A.  Rule 3.6 and Extrajudicial Statements 
A trial’s impact can reach far beyond the courtroom walls.  To protect the 
integrity and fairness of the justice system, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that states have an interest in regulating attorney speech.31  
This section considers how Rule 3.6 seeks to curtail pretrial publicity and 
briefly highlights how the rule has been applied to prosecution and defense 
counsel. 
1.  Rule 3.6 as a Solution to Pretrial Publicity 
Rule 3.6 states that a lawyer who is “participating in or has participated in 
the investigation or litigation of a matter” must not make extrajudicial 
comments that will be made public and have a “substantial likelihood of 
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the matter.”32  Rule 3.6 
attempts to preserve the defendant’s right to a fair trial, based on the 
understanding that juries could be influenced by out-of-court statements.33  
Rule 3.6 is based on the assumption that attorneys are often a considerable 
source of pretrial publicity, and thus restricting their speech is a “significant 
aid” in controlling it.34 
Statements by participating lawyers can be particularly prejudicial, as 
noted by the Supreme Court.35  Rule 3.6’s scope thus reflects the presumption 
that participating attorneys’ intimate knowledge and connection to the case 
suggest they have specialized information and speak from a place of 
authority.36  Statements by nonparticipants are likely not as prejudicial.37  
Indeed, commentary to Rule 3.6 notes that “the public value of informed 
commentary is great and the likelihood of prejudice to a proceeding by the 
commentary of a lawyer who is not involved in the proceeding is small.”38  
Thus, for example, media commentators, who have limited information 
beyond that publicly available, can speak to the issues in cases.39 
Further, Rule 3.6 only restricts those statements that might materially 
prejudice the proceeding by introducing certain information to the potential 
jury pool.40  Thus, certain statements will not violate Rule 3.6 regardless of 
whether the lawyer making the statements is participating in the 
 
 31. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). 
 32. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 33. See id. at cmt. 1. 
 34. See Radu, supra note 22, at 532 (quoting Chi. Council of Laws. v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 
242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
 35. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. at 1057 (opinion of Kennedy, J.) (conceding that “an attorney’s speech about 
pending cases may present dangers that could not arise from statements by a nonparticipant”). 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 3. 
 39. See Sarah K. Fleisch, Note, The Ethics of Legal Commentary:  A Reconsideration of 
the Need for an Ethical Code in Light of the Duke Lacrosse Matter, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
599, 601–02 (2007) (noting that the regulations on trial publicity are concerned only “with 
respect to attorneys involved in a matter, and do[] not extend to attorneys who are not involved, 
but are commentating on such matters”). 
 40. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a); id. r. 3.6 cmt. 1. 
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proceeding.41  Particularly prejudicial statements are those that threaten the 
fairness of the proceeding for the defendant, who is entitled to a fair trial and 
a verdict based on the evidence introduced in the courtroom, not evidence or 
statements made outside the trial.42 
Every state has adopted a version of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (“the Model Rules”),43 with many also adopting Rule 3.6, either in 
its entirety or with modifications.44  In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,45 the 
U.S. Supreme Court considered the disciplining of a defense attorney under 
Nevada Supreme Court Rule 177, which mirrored Rule 3.6’s “substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice” test for extrajudicial statements,46 after the 
attorney held a press conference to counter negative press against his client.47  
The Court overturned Gentile’s disciplinary action.48  The Court found that 
participating attorneys’ speech may be limited when the restraint is narrowly 
tailored to meet the state’s interest.49  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist 
noted that, as representatives of clients in pending cases, lawyers are held to 
a higher ethical standard, and their First Amendment rights can be limited by 
ethical rules barring extrajudicial commentary.50  Thus, the Court affirmed 
the constitutionality of the “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” test 
as a permissible balance between the First Amendment rights of lawyers and 
the state’s interest in fair trials.51  The Court, however, refrained from 
speaking to the constitutionality of a rule that prohibited statements by 
attorneys not participating in the case.52 
Still, despite its worthwhile goals, Rule 3.6 has faced criticism.  In light of 
Gentile, some scholars have suggested that prohibiting attorney speech 
 
 41. The Rule outlines statements that would not likely be materially prejudicial to the 
proceeding. See id. r. 3.6(b). 
 42. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075 (majority opinion). 
 43. See Alphabetical List of Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_o
f_professional_conduct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules/ [https://perma.cc/Y8X7-
KLZV] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 44. See ABA CPR Pol’y Implementation Comm., Rule 3.6:  Trial Publicity,  
AM. BAR ASS’N (Sept. 1, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc-3-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/64HW-ZLMC]. 
 45. 501 U.S. 1030 (1991). 
 46. Id. at 1068. 
 47. See id. at 1063–64. 
 48. See id. at 1058. 
 49. See id. at 1075–76. 
 50. See id. at 1073–75. 
 51. Id. at 1075. 
 52. See id. at 1072 n.5. 
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violates attorneys’ First Amendment rights.53  This is particularly damning, 
where Rule 3.6’s text and application may be flawed.54 
First, Rule 3.6’s standards may be vague, making application of its 
guidance difficult.  At least one scholar has argued that it seems “ludicrous 
to base an entire disciplinary rule around an unproven supposition, and 
punish a lawyer if the lawyer’s good-faith belief that a particular statement is 
unlikely to prejudice a jury is not shared by the state bar disciplinary 
board.”55  Other critics have argued that the Rule is an overly restrictive, and 
potentially inadequate, means of protecting fair trials.56  Although the Rule’s 
text suggests equal application to all participating attorneys, the Rule is 
unequally applied; defense attorneys are more likely to face repercussions57 
despite instances of prosecutorial prejudicial publicity happening more 
frequently.58  Another argument suggests that Rule 3.6 is insufficient to 
safeguard trials from prejudicial information and does not adequately deal 
with involved third parties.59 
2.  How Rule 3.6 Has Traditionally Been Applied 
Traditionally, prosecutors and defense attorneys have been the sources of 
pretrial publicity in criminal cases, as their commentary is perceived—rightly 
or wrongly—by the public to be particularly reliable.60  But, prosecutors and 
 
 53. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence Is Not Golden:  Protecting Lawyer Speech 
Under the First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 863–66, 871–74 (1998) (arguing that 
lawyers’ speech about pending trials is constitutionally protected political speech and any 
restrictions should be subject to strict scrutiny regardless of lawyers’ special position as 
officers of the court); Suzanne F. Day, Note, The Supreme Court’s Attack on Attorneys’ 
Freedom of Expression:  The Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada Decision, 43 CASE W. RSRV. L. 
REV. 1347, 1388–94 (1993) (arguing that the Gentile decision unduly restricts attorney 
speech). 
 54. See, e.g., Katrina M. Kelly, Comment, The “Impartial” Jury and Media Overload:  
Rethinking Attorney Speech Regulation in the 1990s, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 496–504 
(1996) (arguing that Rule 3.6 sets forth a vague, overbroad standard that is ultimately 
ineffective). 
 55. Gabriel G. Gregg, Comment, ABA Rule 3.6 and California Rule 5-120:  A Flawed 
Approach to the Problem of Trial Publicity, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1366 (1996). 
 56. See, e.g., Christopher A. Brown, Note, The Worsening Problem of Trial Publicity:  Is 
“New” Model Rule 3.6 Solution or Surrender?, 29 IND. L. REV. 379, 397 (1995); Radu, supra 
note 22, at 531; infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text. 
 57. See Joel H. Swift, Discriminatory Regulation of Trial Publicity:  A Caveat for the Bar, 
12 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 399, 418 (1992).  The profession’s response appears more concerned 
with defense counsels’ speech, despite evidence that the prosecution appears to be the primary 
source of pretrial publicity. See id. at 416. 
 58. See id. at 406–08 (noting that an ABA study suggests pretrial publicity is tied to the 
prosecution more than the defense). 
 59. See Radu, supra note 22, at 531.  For example, chilling lawyer speech does not 
guarantee that information will not still be circulated by the press or divulged by somebody 
close to the case who is not barred by the Model Rules. See id.  For a more detailed discussion 
of the Rule’s lack of clarity as to third parties, particularly victims’ lawyers, see infra Part 
II.A. 
 60. See Howard, supra note 28, at 67 (citing Chi. Council of Laws. v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 
242, 250 (7th Cir. 1975)). 
1326 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
defense counsel often have different motivations underlying their trial 
publicity and, indeed, often utilize the media in different ways.61 
The prosecutor has direct contact with everybody related to the criminal 
prosecution—including the victims, witnesses, and law enforcement—
making the prosecutor an excellent press target.62  Indeed, prosecutors are 
subject to continuous press coverage as they conduct investigations and 
proceed through the trial.63  Nonetheless, Rule 3.6 limits a prosecutor’s 
public statements about the case64 to, for example, stating the claim,65 
notifying the public of a pending investigation,66 requesting assistance in 
obtaining evidence,67 and warning if a person involved may be dangerous.68  
The prosecutor’s speech often serves significant public interests69 that would 
be permissible under Rule 3.6.70 
However, while Rule 3.6 does allow the prosecution some freedom in 
making extrajudicial statements, the prosecutor holds immense power “to 
deprive persons of their liberty, destroy their reputations, and even bring 
about their death.”71  A prosecutor’s speech, in a culture that—whether 
justifiably or not—finds prosecutors inherently trustworthy, has a greater 
potential to prejudice the defendant vis-à-vis the public.72  Thus, prosecutors 
are prohibited from making statements that would materially prejudice the 
proceeding.73  For example, prosecutors cannot make statements containing 
opinions concerning the defendant’s guilt.74  Comments about specific cases, 
as well as discussions of evidence and the defendant’s character, are also 
examples of impermissible statements.75  Yet, despite Rule 3.6’s clear 
application to prosecutors, regulation of prosecutor speech remains 
inconsistent, and disciplinary action is infrequent.76 
 
 61. See Daniel J. Hurson, The Trial of a Highly Publicized Case—A Prosecutor’s View, 
16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 474 (1979) (“The presence of the press [has] an impact on the 
strategic and tactical considerations by both the prosecution and the defense.”). 
 62. See Scott M. Matheson, Jr., The Prosecutor, the Press, and Free Speech, 58 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 865, 891 (1990). 
 63. See Hurson, supra note 61, at 474. 
 64. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 65. See id. r. 3.6(b)(1). 
 66. See id. r. 3.6(b)(3). 
 67. See id. r. 3.6(b)(5). 
 68. See id. r. 3.6(b)(6). 
 69. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty of Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 
1184 (2015). 
 70. Interestingly, prosecutors have the ability to make the public record by choosing what 
information to include in various court filings, all of which can theoretically be discussed 
under Rule 3.6. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(b)(2).  But see Gershman, supra 
note 69, at 1207 (noting that the public record exception does not give prosecutors freedom to 
“gratuitously place prejudicial information in a public record” for the media to report on). 
 71. Gershman, supra note 69, at 1214. 
 72. See id. at 1215.  Prosecutors’ statements are often seen as authoritative. See id. 
 73. See id. at 1203. 
 74. See id. at 1203–04. 
 75. See id. at 1185. 
 76. See id. at 1185–86, 1188. 
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While regulating prosecutor speech is necessary to preserve a defendant’s 
right to a fair trial,77 defense attorneys, too, are precluded from speaking out 
about a criminal trial to protect “the integrity and fairness of a State’s judicial 
system.”78  Yet, defense attorneys, unlike prosecutors, represent particular 
individuals and thus owe a duty to those clients to advocate on their behalf 
and serve their interests to the greatest and most ethical extent possible.79  In 
fact, defense counsel may have a heightened duty to advocate on a client’s 
behalf, as they protect the defendant’s life, liberty, and property against the 
government.80  Pretrial publicity could be incredibly harmful to the 
defendant, who has the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury.81  Thus, 
defense attorneys also have a duty to protect their clients against prejudice 
from publicity.82 
Although Rule 3.6’s restrictions against extrajudicial statements ought to 
apply equally to both prosecutors and defense counsel,83 some scholars have 
argued that the restrictions should apply in a limited fashion to defense 
counsel.84  Limiting the defense to only a few permissible statements, such 
as denying charges or reminding the public of the presumption of innocence, 
is insufficient when considered alongside the weight of the indictment.85  
Moreover, defense counsel’s extrajudicial commentary is unlikely to 
significantly outweigh the prosecution’s commentary.86 
Recognizing the duty that defense attorneys have and the limitations that 
the Rule itself imposes on attorneys’ ability to advocate for their clients, Rule 
3.6 contains an exception to the general prohibition on extrajudicial 
statements, allowing lawyers to make comments as “required to protect a 
client from the substantial undue prejudicial effect of recent publicity not 
initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer’s client.”87  Such statements must be 
limited to only what is necessary to mitigate adverse publicity.88  This 
provision acknowledges that a response to prejudicial statements may be 
useful in lessening the adverse impact of initial statements on the 
 
 77. See generally id. at 1217–19, 1218 n.215. 
 78. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991); see also Matheson, supra 
note 62, at 877 (noting that Model Rule 3.6 makes no distinction between extrajudicial 
statements by prosecutors or defense). 
 79. See Mawiyah Hooker & Elizabeth Lange, Note, Limiting Extrajudicial Speech in 
High-Profile Cases:  The Duty of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Their Pre-Trial 
Communications with the Media, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 655, 663 (2003). 
 80. See Margaret Tarkington, Lost in the Compromise:  Free Speech, Criminal Justice, 
and Attorney Pretrial Publicity, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1873, 1922 (2014). 
 81. See generally Hooker & Lange, supra note 79, at 663–65. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Sally R. Weaver, Judicial Restrictions on Attorneys’ Speech Concerning Pending 
Litigation:  Reconciling the Rights to Fair Trial and Freedom of Speech, 33 VAND. L. REV. 
499, 514 & n.91 (1980). 
 84. See, e.g., id.; Tarkington, supra note 80, at 1922–35. 
 85. See Weaver, supra note 83, at 514. 
 86. See id. 
 87. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 88. See id. 
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proceeding.89  However, this provision is unlikely to allow the defense much 
reprieve from negative publicity, as even legitimate responses to certain 
public statements could further extrajudicial discussion.90 
B.  The Victim’s Role in the Criminal Trial 
Although the application of Rule 3.6 is relatively clear for lawyers of the 
two parties to the proceeding, the application is less clear for the growing 
body of lawyers who represent a nonparty with great interests.  This section 
highlights victims’ growing role in the criminal proceeding, beginning with 
a brief overview of the victims’ rights movement, before turning to the 
CVRA and how its recognition of victims’ rights and interests has affected 
the victim’s role in criminal cases. 
1.  The Victims’ Rights Movement:  A Push for Greater Rights 
Crime is conceptualized as a wrong committed against the community at 
large.91  Although, historically, crime victims were central to the criminal 
justice process,92 in more modern times the prosecutor carries near absolute 
discretion over the power to charge, prosecute, settle, or dismiss a criminal 
case.93  Moreover, victims have never been afforded true party status in the 
criminal justice system, leaving them as mere nonparty witnesses.94  
Although the criminal trial’s two-party adversarial nature presupposes that 
only the defense and the prosecution have an interest in the case, proponents 
of victims’ rights laws have consistently countered this notion, arguing that 
victims also have a significant interest.95 
Accordingly, the victims’ rights movement grew out of victims’ 
dissatisfaction with the criminal justice process.96  It began during the 1960s, 
crossing the political spectrum and party lines and engaging everyone who 
could see themselves as potential victims.97  The movement sought to bring 
about reforms that would make conviction easier, help victims receive better 
 
 89. See id. r. 3.6 cmt. 7. 
 90. See Hooker & Lange, supra note 79, at 664. 
 91. See Andrew J. Karmen, Who’s Against Victims’ Rights?:  The Nature of the 
Opposition to Pro-Victim Initiatives in Criminal Justice, 8 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
157, 158 (1992). 
 92. See generally Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 366–72 (1986) (detailing the evolution of the modern criminal trial 
and the victim’s changed role). 
 93. See Judith Rowland, Illusions of Justice:  Who Represents the Victim?, 8 ST. JOHN’S 
J. LEGAL COMMENT. 177, 178 (1992). 
 94. See id. 
 95. See generally id. 
 96. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Redefining Roles:  The Victims’ Rights Movement, 1985 
UTAH L. REV. 517, 523–24; see also LOIS HAIGHT HERRINGTON ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME 5 (1982), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/ovc/87299.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT2G-77YD] (“I will never forget being raped, 
kidnapped, and robbed at gunpoint.  However, my sense of disillusionment of the judicial 
system is many times more painful.” (quoting unnamed crime victim)). 
 97. See Abrahamson, supra note 96, at 521–32. 
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treatment in the criminal justice system, and ensure the active participation 
by victims in criminal proceedings.98 
The importance of active victim participation grew out of an emphasis on 
the negative psychological effects that could arise when victims are not given 
a meaningful chance to participate in criminal proceedings.99  Indeed, it was 
argued that giving victims a voice could improve their mental condition and 
welfare.100  Recognizing these interests, Congress passed the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act, seeking to give crime victims participatory rights in the criminal 
justice process.101 
The CVRA was enacted as a result of advocacy by various victims’ rights 
groups,102 ultimately passing both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate with overwhelming majority support.103  Due to the large volume of 
criminal proceedings in state courts, Congress intended the CVRA to serve 
as a model for the states in amending their constitutional and statutory 
provisions to expand victims’ rights.104  Today, all states have their own 
victims’ rights legislation or amendments.105 
Although not the first federal crime victims’ rights statute, the CVRA was 
the first to grant victims standing to enforce their rights.106  As such, the 
CVRA explicitly contains an enforcement mechanism that entitles victims to 
seek mandamus review in appellate courts if their rights have been 
violated.107 
The CVRA grants victims ten enumerated rights,108 among them the right 
to reasonable and timely notice of proceedings,109 the right not to be excluded 
from any court proceeding unless the victim’s testimony would be materially 
 
 98. See Erin Ann O’Hara, Victim Participation in the Criminal Process, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 
229, 244 (2005). 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See Paul G. Cassell & Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim’s Expanding Role in a System 
of Public Prosecution:  A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, 105 NW. 
L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 177 (2011). 
 102. See David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies:  The Federal Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 631 (2008). 
 103. See id. at 632 (noting that the Senate passed the CVRA by a vote of 96–1, and the 
House passed it by a vote of 393–14). 
 104. See id. at 633. 
 105. See Victims’ Rights, PRETRIAL JUST. CTR. FOR CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/pjcc/ 
topics/victims [https://perma.cc/9VN9-UDNY] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021) (“All states, the 
District of Columbia, and most U.S. territories have statutory or constitutional provisions that 
enumerate rights and protections for victims of crime.”).  The National Conference of State 
Legislatures maintains a searchable database of all state legislation concerning victims’ rights. 
See Victims’ Pretrial Release Rights and Protections, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-victims-rights-and-
protections.aspx [https://perma.cc/EH4Y-8L9M] (last visited Oct. 29, 2021). 
 106. See Russell P. Butler, What Practitioners and Judges Need to Know Regarding Crime 
Victims’ Participatory Rights in Federal Sentencing Proceedings, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 21, 21 
(2006). 
 107. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3). 
 108. See id. § 3771(a). 
 109. See id. § 3771(a)(2). 
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altered by hearing other testimony,110 the right to be reasonably heard at any 
public proceeding,111 the right to restitution,112 and the right to be treated 
with fairness and respect.113  To ensure victims are able to exercise these 
rights, the CVRA also permits victims to seek the advice of an attorney.114 
2.  The Victim’s Role and Interests 
Victims have a unique role within the criminal justice system, as allies of 
the government prosecutors and as independent actors with their own 
interests, which can, and often do, conflict with the interests of the 
prosecutors.115  Thus, giving crime victims new rights “necessitate[d] a 
shake-up in the balance of power within the adversarial system.”116  The 
CVRA grants victims certain procedural rights, such as the right to be heard 
regarding pleas and sentencing.117  Under the CVRA, the victim is no longer 
an outsider but can be present and vocal in the criminal trial.118  Further, the 
CVRA’s appellate review provision represents a powerful new remedy to 
protect crime victims.119 
However, the CVRA does not give victims party status in criminal 
trials.120  Therefore, the trial is still an adversarial procedure between the 
prosecutor and the defendant.121  Further, victims only have standing to 
enforce their rights in connection with claims arising under the CVRA.122  
Thus, the victim is in an unusual position:  the victim undoubtedly has rights 
and an acknowledged stake in the proceeding, but the victim is still an 
outsider, rather than a party, to the criminal trial.123  While victims have been 
granted certain participatory rights, these rights are inherently tied to the 
 
 110. See id. § 3771(a)(3). 
 111. See id. § 3771(a)(4). 
 112. See id. § 3771(a)(6). 
 113. See id. § 3771(a)(8). 
 114. The CVRA does not explicitly provide the right for a private attorney, but this right 
can be inferred from the provisions. See, e.g., id. § 3771(c)(2) (“The prosecutor shall advise 
the crime victim that the crime victim can seek the advice of an attorney with respect to the 
rights described . . . .”). 
 115. See Karmen, supra note 91, at 160–61. 
 116. See id. at 161. 
 117. See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 101, at 167. 
 118. See id. at 182–83. 
 119. See id. at 169. 
 120. See Erin C. Blondel, Note, Victims’ Rights in an Adversary System, 58 DUKE L.J. 237, 
259 (2008) (“[N]owhere does the CVRA suggest that it confers party or even intervenor status 
on victims.”); see also United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[V]ictims . . . are not accorded formal party status, nor are they even accorded intervenor 
status . . . .”). 
 121. See Blondel, supra note 120, at 259 (“The government and the defendant thus remain 
the sole parties to criminal prosecutions.”). 
 122. See id. at 259–60; see also Cassell & Joffee, supra note 101, at 170–71 (“[T]he Act’s 
enforcement provision specifically provides victims with appellate review only when their 
enumerated rights are violated.”). 
 123. See Blondel, supra note 120, at 259; see also Susan Bandes, Victim Standing, 1999 
UTAH L. REV. 331, 337 (“The adversary system, in a criminal case, assumes only two parties:  
the government and the defendant.”). 
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CVRA.124  Thus, it is unclear, for example, if victims can assert these rights 
at the investigatory stage of the prosecution or only once charges have been 
brought.125 
Nonetheless, the CVRA reflects an acknowledgement that victims have a 
stake in the proceeding126 and “legitimate interests” tied to the criminal 
case.127  Among the interests that victims have, first, is an interest in 
retribution128 and in seeing the case resolved justly.129  Second, victims may 
have an interest in restitution.130  Third, victims likely have an interest in 
preserving their privacy.131  Fourth, victims generally have an interest in 
avoiding retraumatization, which may occur as a result of going through the 
proceeding and reliving the crime.132  Fifth, victims have an interest in having 
their voices heard.133  Often, the victim has a story to tell, and it could be 
incredibly beneficial for the victim to tell that story.134  Finally, victims have 
an interest in preserving their autonomy throughout the criminal 
proceeding.135 
 
 124. See Blondel, supra note 120, at 259–60. 
 125. There has been conflict regarding when CVRA rights attach, as some prosecutors 
argue that various CVRA rights do not attach until the formal charges are brought. See 
Margaret Garvin & Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victim Agency:  Independent Lawyers for 
Sexual Assault Victims, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 67, 81–82 (2015) (detailing this conflict).  In 
order for the CVRA’s purposes and goals to be fully realized, however, the rights may need 
to extend to victims even before formal charges are filed. See Paul G. Cassell et al., Crime 
Victims’ Rights During Criminal Investigations?:  Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act 
Before Criminal Charges Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 62, 69–71 (2014) 
(arguing that CVRA rights attach before formal charging). 
 126. See 150 CONG. REC. 22,951 (2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“Victims are the 
persons who are directly harmed by the crime and they have a stake in the criminal process 
because of that harm.”). 
 127. Id. at 22,952. 
 128. See Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Action:  An 
Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 117, 136 (1983). 
 129. See Lois Haight Herrington, The Victim of Crime, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 153, 161–62 (1985) 
(noting that victims have an interest in fair adjudication of the case); see also Douglas Evan 
Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process:  The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH 
L. REV. 289, 294 n.30. 
 130. See Herrington, supra note 129, at 162–63 (discussing the value of restitution for 
victims). 
 131. See Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 77 (arguing that victims of sexual assault are 
“confronted with potential privacy intrusions at nearly every turn . . . from subpoenas for their 
confidential or privileged records . . . to motions to examine the victim’s body, mind, or 
dwelling”). 
 132. See id. at 70–71; see also Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 81, 
84–86 (2020) (discussing how victims are retraumatized in the criminal justice process). 
 133. See O’Hara, supra note 98, at 244. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 70–72.  Autonomy, or agency, can be defined 
as “the ability to meaningfully choose whether, when, how, and to what extent to meaningfully 
participate in the system and exercise their rights.” Id. at 71.  For crime victims, having agency 
can make the difference between a positive experience with the criminal justice system and 
an experience that leads to secondary victimization. See id. at 71–72. 
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C.  The Victim’s Lawyer as Advocate 
Despite the limitations of the CVRA, victims may retain attorneys to 
ensure all rights granted to the victim in the law are protected throughout the 
proceeding.136  As discussed below, victims might choose to retain counsel 
to protect—and to advocate on behalf of—their interests.137  After 
considering why victims might choose to retain independent counsel, this 
section examines the different reasons why a victim’s lawyer might choose 
to engage in extrajudicial commentary. 
1.  The Role of the Victim’s Counsel 
Despite the progress made by various victims’ rights laws, victims are still 
denied agency or autonomy within the criminal process.138  Specifically, 
victims have no control over how their experiences will be told at trial.139  
When the prosecutor calls the victim as a witness, “the victim’s story is 
shaped and appropriated by others.”140  Since the prosecutor represents the 
state and not the victim,141 the prosecutor may face ethical conflicts if 
seeking to represent the interests of both the state and the victim.142  And, 
although victims have the right to retain counsel, there is no explicit right to 
an attorney for victims in criminal trials.143  Thus, for victims to be 
sufficiently represented in the criminal justice system, victims may need 
independent counsel.144 
Accordingly, “victim lawyers are . . . a source of personal representation 
through which to advance the agency of the victim in a justice system that 
would otherwise limit the victim.”145  The values that have shaped the 
 
 136. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) (noting that a crime victim or their “lawful representative” 
may assert the rights afforded); 150 CONG. REC. 7295 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne 
Feinstein) (“This part of the bill is what makes this legislation so important, and different from 
earlier legislation:  It provides mechanisms to enforce the set of rights provided to victims of 
crime.”). 
 137. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 138. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 316–18. 
 139. See id. at 317. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights:  The 
Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 563 (2005) (“A prosecutor’s 
‘clients’ are the people who live in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, including police, witnesses, 
crime victims, and even the accused.”).  The Model Rules do not address the prosecutor’s 
responsibilities to crime victims, but they do note that prosecutors have a general duty to serve 
the cause of justice. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 142. See Rowland, supra note 93, at 191 (“[T]here is a very real possibility that prosecutors 
violate the Canon of Ethics when they purport to represent both the interests of the state and 
the interests of the victim in the same case.”). 
 143. See 150 CONG. REC. 22,952 (2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“This bill does not 
provide victims with a right to counsel but recognizes that a victim may enlist a counsel on 
their own.”); see also Butler, supra note 106, at 24 (noting that “[t]here is no express statutory 
provision for the appointment of counsel for most victims, but such authority is implicit in the 
CVRA”). 
 144. See Rowland, supra note 93, at 194. 
 145. Tyrone Kirchengast, Victim Lawyers, Victim Advocates, and the Adversarial Criminal 
Trial, 16 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 568, 572 (2013). 
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evolution of the victim’s role in the criminal justice system—dignity, 
fairness, and respect for privacy—are the foundation for due process rights 
for victims.146  Such due process rights, which take the form of fair notice 
and an opportunity to be heard,147 might only be realized if victims retain 
legal counsel, allowing them to achieve true agency.148 
Independent lawyers can help victims attain the benefits provided by the 
CVRA.  The CVRA recognizes both the victims’ interest in fair notice149 and 
the victims’ interest in being heard.150  For instance, the CVRA provides 
victims with the right to be reasonably heard regarding plea bargains and 
sentencing.151  This extends victims participatory opportunities, even if the 
participation has no effect on the proceeding.152  Yet, this opportunity to 
participate has immense benefits for the victim, as the victim gains “access 
to a forum that directly and individually acknowledges her victimhood.”153  
These benefits were the driving force behind the CVRA, as Congress 
understood the harm that befalls victims when they are left entirely outside 
of the criminal process.154 
Focusing particularly on sexual assault victims, two scholars have argued 
that the use of “Special Victim Counsel” in military sexual assault cases 
greatly increased victim satisfaction with the investigation and court process, 
which in turn helped the victims exercise their agency in engaging with the 
system.155  By contrast, the current civilian process typically entails “entering 
a criminal process in which the victims’ rights and privacy protections that 
exist on paper can rarely be accessed without a lawyer.”156  In other words, 
victims may be prevented from protecting their privacy, rights, and interests 
because they do not have access to lawyers.157  Therefore, independent 
lawyers play a crucial role in safeguarding victims’ rights,158 enabling 
victims to assert their agency and helping victims engage with—and 
effectively navigate—the criminal justice system.159 
 
 146. See Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 67–68. 
 147. See id. at 68. 
 148. See id. (“Crime victim agency . . . at its core is the right and power of individuals to 
make fundamental decisions about their lives.”). 
 149. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2). 
 150. See id. § 3771(a)(4). 
 151. See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 101, at 167. 
 152. See id. at 182.  Even if the victim’s story at sentencing does not impart any new 
information to the court, the very chance to speak may itself be important. See id. 
 153. Mary Margaret Giannini, Equal Rights for Equal Rites?:  Victim Allocution, 
Defendant Allocution, and the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 452 
(2008). 
 154. See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 101, at 183. 
 155. See Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 72–75 (arguing that the military’s Special 
Victim Counsel is a powerful illustration of how to provide for victim agency in a civilian 
criminal justice system). 
 156. Id. at 75. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See Rowland, supra note 93, at 194. 
 159. See Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 75. 
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2.  A Victim’s Lawyer’s Extrajudicial Statements 
Victims have multiple interests that might be vindicated through 
extrajudicial comments made by their lawyers.  First, the victim has an 
interest in retribution—or in seeing the case resolved justly.160  Thus, a 
victim may, in certain situations, want the attorney to speak out about the 
case to secure harsher punishment or place pressure on a court or even on the 
jury.161  For example, if there is a plea deal being considered, the victim 
might seek to galvanize public support against the deal.162  In such cases, the 
public’s outrage at the harm suffered by the victim might lead the prosecution 
to take the case to trial.163  Victims might also want their lawyers to speak 
out on their behalf when they want the prosecution to succeed, whether 
because the victim wants retribution or restitution or just to take an allegedly 
dangerous person off of the streets.164 
 
 160. See Gittler, supra note 128, at 140–42; see also Abrahamson, supra note 96, at 565 
(“The victim’s—and the public’s—interest is to apprehend the offender, prosecute promptly 
and impose a fair penalty considering the offender, the offense, the victim and the public.”). 
 161. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 870–71 (noting that attorneys might speak to the 
press to encourage settlement or to ensure that public scrutiny leads to a careful and fair 
judgment). 
 162. Although victims have enhanced status in the trial and may have the opportunity to 
consult with the prosecutor, they still lack power to control the prosecutor’s decisions during 
the plea disposition process. See Gershman, supra note 141, at 574.  Notably, federal 
prosecutors have argued that, under the CVRA, prosecutors are not required to notify victims 
about plea dispositions prior to formal charges being pressed. See Garvin & Beloof, supra 
note 125, at 81.  The Justice Department took this position in defending its decision not to 
notify Epstein’s victims about a secret nonprosecution agreement it reached with Epstein, 
claiming that there was no obligation to notify victims about the deal since Epstein was never 
formally charged. See id.  When this eventually came to light, it sparked outrage; if the victims 
had known about the plea deal being negotiated, even if they had no formal CVRA rights to 
provide their input, they could have spoken out about it publicly, both personally and through 
their lawyers, to bring attention to the case and garner support against the deal. See generally 
Patricia Mazzei, Prosecutors Broke Law in Agreement Not to Prosecute Jeffrey Epstein, Judge 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/jeffrey-epstein-
judge-prosecution-agreement.html [https://perma.cc/S39L-ZXWP]. 
 163. Studies, however, have shown that the prosecution often already has judgments about 
the likelihood of securing a conviction in a given case prior to meeting with the victim. See 
Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 310 n.76.  However, the prosecution’s judgment about a 
case’s success is often based on the likely reaction of the jury to the evidence. See id.  Thus, a 
victim’s lawyer could shift the public’s opinion and perception about a case in favor of the 
victim through extrajudicial statements, especially if those comments are disseminated widely. 
See, e.g., Howard, supra note 28, at 63 (noting “what a powerful litigation tool the media can 
be . . . in shaping pretrial public opinion, and thus potential jurors’ opinions on a criminal 
case”). 
 164. Such statements might speak to the credibility of the defendant or merits of the case. 
See, e.g., supra note 12.  Similarly, victims might want their lawyers to initiate an 
investigation, such as in the Epstein case, where the Justice Department sought information 
from Prince Andrew, Duke of York, regarding his connection to Epstein. See, e.g., Prince 
Andrew ‘Falsely Portraying Himself as Willing’, US Prosecutor Claims, BBC NEWS  
(June 9, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-52973219 [https://perma.cc/7NK6-NKBE].  
Gloria Allred, a lawyer for several of Epstein’s victims, believes that Prince Andrew has “very 
little credibility” and has implored him to testify under oath. Id.  Her statements appear to be 
geared toward furthering the investigation on behalf of her clients. 
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In addition, victims have an interest in protecting their reputation and their 
privacy.165  If, for example, the media or the defense counsel opine on the 
victim’s character or personal details, the victim’s lawyer might have a 
legitimate reason to speak to the press, either to rehabilitate the client’s 
reputation or prevent discussions about private information.166  Relatedly, 
the victim has an interest in avoiding harassment by the defendant.167  For 
example, a defendant may argue that the victim provoked the alleged 
incident, calling into question the victim’s character.168  Particularly in cases 
involving sexual assault, the defense may attempt to discredit a victim with 
negative character evidence.169  In such cases, the victim’s lawyer might, by 
speaking to the media, seek to set the story straight or to preserve the victim’s 
dignity by ensuring that the victim’s public image is not tarnished.170 
Victims also have an interest in avoiding revictimization through contact 
with the criminal justice system, which can cause psychological trauma.171  
Victims are often retraumatized in court when they are called as witnesses, 
especially when their integrity and character might be scrutinized.172  
Retraumatization can chill victim participation in criminal proceedings, 
resulting in distrust in the judicial system among the victim community.173  
Often, retraumatization is the result of victim-blaming attitudes and 
practices, which can result in additional trauma.174  Victims are likely to feel 
blamed by the defendant or the defendant’s attorney in criminal trials.175  
Aside from cross-examination, which is designed to undermine the victim’s 
credibility,176 victims might find their credibility brought into question 
outside of the courtroom, as well.  In such cases, victims’ attorneys might 
 
 165. See Gittler, supra note 128, at 142. 
 166. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 869; Garvin & Beloof, supra note 125, at 77 
(noting that victims of crime are subject to privacy intrusions and arguing that attorneys can 
help protect clients’ privacy interests).  Much like defendants, who may not want to wait until 
acquittal and allow irreparable injury to their reputations in the meantime, victims may not 
want to wait until the trial is over to protect their reputations from the press. See generally L. 
Cooper Campbell, Gentile v. State Bar and Model Rule 3.6:  Overly Broad Restrictions on 
Attorney Speech and Pretrial Publicity, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 583, 604–05 (1993). 
 167. See Gittler, supra note 128, at 142. 
 168. See id. 
 169. See id. at 142 n.88. 
 170. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wagmeister, Gloria Allred Rips Apart Weinstein’s Defense Team 
for ‘Putting the Blame on Women,’ VARIETY (Jan. 28, 2020, 7:59 AM), https://variety.com/ 
2020/biz/news/gloria-allred-miriam-haley-harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-trial-
1203483664/ [https://perma.cc/9V8B-CZXK] (“[W]e’ve heard every rape myth practically in 
the book today . . . .  Obviously the defense is playing that old script line that the only victim 
in this is Harvey Weinstein . . . .  I guess that all of the witnesses so far must be lying because 
they can’t remember every single detail.”). 
 171. See Katirai, supra note 132, at 84–85. 
 172. See id. at 84. 
 173. See id. at 96. 
 174. See id. at 88. 
 175. See id. at 91. 
 176. See id. at 102. 
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seek to preserve their clients’ reputation and dignity as a means of avoiding 
retraumatization at the hands of a particularly intrusive media.177 
Further, victims have an interest in telling their stories.178  Victims can 
rarely, if ever, tell their stories during trial.179  Importantly, victims may not 
wish to wait until sentencing to tell their stories or to respond to other parties’ 
statements to the media.180  Instead, victims might want to tell their stories 
earlier on in the proceedings; this could be particularly important for their 
sense of agency.181  Therefore, victims might lean on their attorneys to 
protect them through extrajudicial commentary.  Still, as the next part 
examines, it is unclear whether Rule 3.6 serves as a bar to such a form of 
client representation. 
II.  RULE 3.6’S APPLICATION TO VICTIMS’ LAWYERS 
The victims’ rights movement brought attention to victims and their 
privately retained attorneys in criminal proceedings.  Given the concerns 
about pretrial publicity and the unusual position that victims’ lawyers 
occupy, this part addresses whether victims’ lawyers must adhere to Rule 3.6.  
Part II.A considers whether Rule 3.6’s text and purpose support its 
application to victims’ lawyers.  Part II.B evaluates the various policy 
concerns driving the victims’ rights movement and victims’ rights laws and 
whether these policies also support the application of Rule 3.6 to victims’ 
lawyers. 
A.  The Uncertain Meaning and Application of the Rule 
This section shows that the application of Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers in 
cases where their public statements would materially prejudice criminal 
proceedings is unclear.  First, this section closely reviews Rule 3.6’s text.  
 
 177. See, e.g., Elizabeth Wagmeister, Gloria Allred Slams Weinstein’s Lead Attorney for 
Making Statements to the Media That Are ‘Insulting to Women,’ VARIETY (Feb. 19, 2020,  
1:10 PM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/gloria-allred-donna-rotunno-media-interviews-
gag-order-1203508143/ [https://perma.cc/YZ9E-48NM].  In responding to Donna Rotunno, 
Harvey Weinstein’s defense attorney, who suggested that she had never been a victim of 
sexual assault because she never put herself “in that position,” Gloria Allred said, “I think it’s 
insensitive, and it’s blaming victims for their own rape or sexual abuse so I don’t think it’s 
appropriate.” Id. 
 178. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 296, 312, 328 (emphasizing that 
victims may want to choose how and when to share their stories). 
 179. See id. at 317 (“[V]ictims have no control . . . over how they or the lawyers at trial tell 
their story.”).  Generally, the victim’s story is not the victim’s own throughout the criminal 
process; instead, once the prosecution calls the victim as a witness, the victim’s story is shaped 
by the attorneys. See id.; see also Katirai, supra note 132, at 107 (“The formalism of our legal 
system . . . requires survivors to fit their narratives into specific rules and procedures . . . 
which limit their ability to tell their own story as a meaningful narrative.”). 
 180. Under Rule 3.6, victims’ lawyers could theoretically speak out in response to 
statements made by other attorneys in the proceeding. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 
3.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  Such a carveout, however, requires that another attorney make 
the negative statements first. See id. 
 181. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 316–17; Garvin & Beloof, supra 
note 125, at 71. 
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After conducting a textual analysis, this section considers whether the 
application of Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers aligns with its original purpose. 
1.  Looking to Rule 3.6’s Text 
As previously discussed, a victim’s lawyer might make extrajudicial 
comments for various reasons.182  Rule 3.6, on its face, is not a total bar 
against such statements.  Rather, the Rule bars statements made by a lawyer 
who is “participating” or “has participated in” the investigation or litigation 
of a matter.183  Further, Rule 3.6 bars statements that a lawyer should 
reasonably know would be disseminated publicly and will have “a substantial 
likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter.”184  Thus, regardless of whether the victim’s lawyer is participating 
in the proceeding or not, certain statements will not violate Rule 3.6 because 
they do not materially prejudice the proceeding.185 
Rule 3.6’s current language is markedly different from its original 
language, as the original rule was modified to address constitutional concerns 
of vagueness and overbreadth.186  However, in addition to the previous 
“reasonable likelihood” standard, Rule 3.6’s precursor, Disciplinary Rule 
7-107 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“DR 7-107”), 
applied to all lawyers “associated with” the investigation of a criminal 
matter187 and “associated with” the prosecution or defense once criminal 
proceedings began.188  Thus, in People v. Buttafuoco,189 a state trial court 
judge in New York found that the attorney for the defendant’s wife was 
associated with the criminal proceeding190 and ultimately directed “all 
attorneys associated with this case . . . to assiduously comply” with DR 
7-107.191  This holding expanded DR 7-107’s terms, as the phrase 
“associated with” was held to cover lawyers who were not only attorneys of 
record but were significantly tied to the proceeding.192  Nonetheless, it is 
 
 182. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 183. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. r. 3.6(b); see also id. r. 3.6 cmt. 4 (noting that the statements in Rule 3.6(b) 
“would not ordinarily be considered to present a substantial likelihood of material prejudice, 
and should not . . . be considered prohibited”).  This Note assumes that the victim’s lawyer 
will be making materially prejudicial statements, since Rule 3.6 would simply not apply 
otherwise. See id. r. 3.6(a). 
 186. See Lynn S. Fulstone, Note, Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada:  Trial in the “Court of 
Public Opinion” and Coping with Model Rule 3.6—Where Do We Go from Here?, 37 VILL. 
L. REV. 619, 630 & n.54 (1992); see also id. at 624–30 (detailing the development of DR 
7-107 and the subsequent development of Rule 3.6). 
 187. MODEL CODE OF PRO. RESP. DR 7-107(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980). 
 188. Id. DR 7-107(B). 
 189. 599 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1993). 
 190. See id. at 422 (finding that DR 7-107’s “associated with” language did not limit its 
scope to only attorneys who represented parties). 
 191. Id. at 424. 
 192. See Joan C. Bohl, Extrajudicial Attorney Speech and Pending Criminal Prosecutions:  
The Investigatory Commission Meets A.B.A. Model Rule 3.6, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 951, 956 
n.23 (1996) (highlighting two New Jersey Supreme Court cases concluding that Rule 3.6’s 
1338 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
unclear whether the drafters had anticipated the rule applying to anybody 
other than litigants, given the limited history and paucity of judicial decisions 
interpreting the language of the Rule. 
Moreover, the ABA later changed this language, instead focusing Rule 
3.6’s scope on participation.193  And, while regulation of participating 
lawyers’ extrajudicial statements has been approved by the Supreme Court, 
there is no suggestion that the Rule could regulate a nonparticipating lawyer’s 
commentary.194  While the Rule’s plain text seems to limit its scope,195 a 
broad reading could cause the language to serve as a blanket prohibition on 
all lawyer communication covering any lawyer who is in any way associated 
with the proceeding.196 
Further, Rule 3.6 does not specify whether an attorney is a participant by 
virtue of representing a participant or if the attorney must actively participate 
in the proceeding to be covered by the Rule.197  A victim’s attorney actively 
participates in the proceeding when, for example, the attorney enters an 
appearance on the record on behalf of the victim.198  However, Rule 3.6 does 
not appear to be so limited in its application. 
 
predecessor should apply to attorneys who have significant contacts with the matter, even if 
not attorneys of record (first citing In re Hinds, 449 A.2d 483, 496 (N.J. 1982), then citing In 
re Rachmiel, 449 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1982))). 
 193. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  As noted above, 
Rule 3.6 was promulgated to resolve constitutional concerns with DR 7-107’s language. See 
supra note 186 and accompanying text.  However, it is not clear that the “associated with” 
portion of DR 7-107 had been changed to limit the rule’s application. MODEL CODE OF PRO. 
RESP. DR 7-107.  Nonetheless, this ambiguity raises concerns about the application of Rule 
3.6 to third parties. 
 194. Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1072 n.5 (1991) (“We express no opinion 
on the constitutionality of a rule regulating the statements of a lawyer who is not participating 
in the pending case about which the statements are made.”). 
 195. This argument can be drawn from the text of the Model Rule and the additional 
commentary thereto. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (focusing on 
“participat[ion]” in the investigation or litigation of the matter); id. r. 3.6 cmt. 3 (“[T]he rule 
applies only to lawyers who are, or who have been involved in the investigation or litigation 
of a case . . . .”). 
 196. The Rule’s commentary is clear about the danger of pretrial publicity and the 
importance of drawing a balance between attorneys’ right to speech and the general right to a 
fair trial. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1.  Arguably, lawyers even remotely 
associated with a legal proceeding could potentially threaten this precarious balance by 
making extrajudicial comments.  Still, the drafters of the Model Rules have expanded the reach 
of rules limiting extrajudicial commentary to anybody “associated with” the prosecutor in the 
trial, including investigators and other law enforcement personnel. Id. r. 3.8(f).  It is therefore 
possible that the ABA could have similarly specified everybody to whom Rule 3.6 applied, 
rather than limiting the Rule’s application to participating attorneys. Compare id. with id. 
r. 3.6. 
 197. Cf. NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., THE VICTIM’S ATTORNEY AND THE MEDIA:  RULES 
OF PROFESSIONALISM REGARDING EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS 1 (2017), 
https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/25188-ncvli-newsletter---the-victims-attorney-and-the 
[https://perma.cc/T9P9-GALC] (noting that the likelihood of Rule 3.6’s application to 
victims’ lawyers is increased when they file a notice of appearance in the case). 
 198. See generally Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels:  The Scott Campbell, 
Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 581, 616–17 (2005). 
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Although Rule 3.6 does not provide any guidance on who is a participant, 
the adversarial nature of the criminal trial supposes that the two parties and 
their attorneys are participants.199  Therefore, since the CVRA confers 
neither party nor intervenor status to victims,200 victims likely cannot be true 
participants, reflecting the traditional understanding of the adversary 
system.201  Indeed, the adversary system does not anticipate victims 
challenging the well-established two-party scheme.202 
It is unclear, however, that limiting participation under Rule 3.6 to only 
the prosecution and defense would comport with the Rule itself.  While the 
Rule is ambiguous, the comments to the Rule clearly state that commentary 
by nonparticipants will have a small likelihood of prejudice.203  The 
emphasis on participation is rooted in the fact that participating attorneys are 
often privy to important details about the case.204  By virtue of this 
specialized knowledge, the participating attorneys are not only able to impart 
more information to the media but can also cause more damage, as they are 
perceived to be authorities regarding the case.205  These concerns underlying 
the emphasis on participation are explored in greater detail below. 
2.  The Purpose of the Rule and Its Limitation to Participants 
Rule 3.6’s text does not clearly specify whether the victim’s lawyer is a 
“participant” in a proceeding and thus subject to the Rule’s limitation on 
extrajudicial commentary.  Considering the application of Rule 3.6 to 
victims’ lawyers therefore requires looking beyond the Rule’s text to 
consider its underlying purpose. 
Rule 3.6 limits its scope to participants in part because statements by 
participating lawyers are particularly prejudicial, as the Supreme Court has 
noted.206  Participating lawyers’ intimate knowledge and connection to the 
case presumes that they have specialized information and speak from a place 
of authority.207  Statements by nonparticipants, on the other hand, are not as 
likely to be prejudicial since there is no presumption of intimate knowledge.  
 
 199. See Blondel, supra note 120, at 239. 
 200. See id. at 240. 
 201. At least one federal district court has expressed concern when applying the CVRA, 
noting that if it were to involve itself in a dispute concerning the victims’ right to fairness, 
respect, and dignity, it would “potentially compromis[e] its ability to be impartial to the 
government and defendant, the only true parties to the trial.” United States v. Rubin, 558 F. 
Supp. 2d 411, 428 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (emphasis added). 
 202. See Blondel, supra note 120, at 240. 
 203. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 204. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1991). 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. (“Because lawyers have special access to information through discovery and 
client communications, their extrajudicial statements pose a threat to the fairness of a pending 
proceeding since lawyers’ statements are likely to be received as especially authoritative.”). 
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For instance, Rule 3.6 does not apply to legal news commentators, who can 
speak to the press regarding the potential merits of a case.208 
Thus, the victims’ lawyers would need to speak with the same authority as 
the prosecutors or defense counsel to fall within Rule 3.6’s scope.  
Nonetheless, the victim’s attorney could be seen as more like a public 
commentator, as the victim’s lawyer does not have the same access to the 
prosecutor’s case-in-chief and its accompanying evidence.209 
On the other hand, one can argue that the victim’s lawyer is similar to the 
prosecution, especially since the victim’s lawyer often shares similar goals 
with the prosecution.  The victim’s lawyer also has access to relevant facts 
pertaining to the victim’s experience, which could be prejudicial if shared 
prior to or outside a criminal proceeding.210  Further, the victim’s lawyer 
might try to work with the prosecution, and in that case, the lawyer would 
likely be in a position of similar authority.211  Indeed, victims often provide 
investigative, financial, and tactical assistance to prosecutors.212  Moreover, 
a victim’s attorney speaking on behalf of the victim about the case arguably 
presents a much more personal view than the prosecutor, who represents the 
government.213 
Beyond participation, Rule 3.6 highlights the important principle behind 
limiting extrajudicial statements:  the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair 
trial by an impartial jury.214  The defendant’s right to a fair trial is so 
fundamental that the Supreme Court has held that it outweighs participating 
lawyers’ constitutionally protected free speech rights.215 
It might be argued that the interests of a defendant in a criminal proceeding 
outweigh the victim’s interests.  After all, defendants’ life or liberty is on the 
line, and extrajudicial commentary could endanger their freedom.216  In 
criminal jury trials, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty, so 
allowing any lawyer to call that innocence into question through extrajudicial 
commentary could strip the defendant of the right to a fair trial.217  If the 
 
 208. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Laurie Levenson, The Ethics of Being a Commentator, 69 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1303, 1315–16 (1996) (noting that commentators are not covered by Rule 
3.6’s rationale). 
 209. Although the CVRA grants victims the right to confer with the prosecution, there is 
no suggestion that the victim or the victim’s attorney is entitled to all of the government’s case 
files and information. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). 
 210. The victim’s lawyer knows facts about the victim’s experience, some of which may 
be inadmissible in court as hearsay or character evidence.  Inadmissible evidence is 
particularly prejudicial if publicly released. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) 
(“[The defendant’s] verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the trial.”). 
 211. See, e.g., supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Gershman, supra note 141, at 560 n.4. 
 213. Although the prosecutor likely has information about the victim’s experience, the 
prosecutor does not represent the victim and likely has a different approach to the victim’s 
testimony than the victim’s attorney. See generally supra notes 140–41 and accompanying 
text. 
 214. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991). 
 215. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074–75. 
 216. See generally Gregg, supra note 55, at 1326–27. 
 217. See id. at 1327. 
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defendant was wrongly accused, the victim’s lawyer’s statements could 
continue to haunt the defendant and permanently ruin the defendant’s 
reputation, even if the charges are eventually dropped.218 
Thus, there are legitimate concerns in applying Rule 3.6 to the prosecution 
and defense counsel, while excluding victims’ lawyers from its purview.  
Attorneys’ extrajudicial statements, including those made by victims’ 
lawyers, could be particularly threatening to the fairness of a proceeding, as 
lawyers’ statements could be perceived as especially authoritative.219  With 
limits on both the prosecution and defense under Rule 3.6 and its state 
counterparts,220 allowing victims’ attorneys to speak freely could help the 
prosecution build a case within the public realm, while keeping the defense 
silent.221  Helping the prosecution build a case publicly in this way could 
erode the defendant’s right to a fair trial by overwhelming the jury with 
information that presupposes the defendant’s guilt.222  Accordingly, when 
considering the application of the Rule to victims’ attorneys, examining the 
purpose of Rule 3.6 highlights arguments for both interpretations of the Rule. 
3.  The Victim’s Lawyer as a Participant 
Rule 3.6’s emphasis on participation is likely based on the unique 
knowledge and authority participation inherently entails and the danger this 
could pose to the defendant’s fair trial.223  This section considers the 
underlying concerns in the interpretation of Rule 3.6’s text and when, for 
purposes of the Rule, a victim’s lawyer might be participating in the 
proceeding. 
 
 218. See id. (“[E]xtensive media coverage of a targeted party can often destroy that party’s 
reputation, irrespective of the ultimate verdict.”). 
 219. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text.  Arguably, extrajudicial commentary 
by a victim’s attorneys could harm the defendant’s case, since it could likely speak to the harm 
suffered by the victim, which might presuppose the defendant’s guilt. See MODEL RULES OF 
PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 5(4). 
 220. The prosecution and defense counsel are both participating attorneys and are subject 
to Rule 3.6. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 221. See, e.g., Wagmeister, supra note 177 (“[Defense Attorney] Cheronis claimed that 
Allred is essentially a megaphone for the prosecution’s case, repeatedly speaking to the media 
about her three clients . . . who have all testified against Weinstein in the New York criminal 
trial.”).  In the criminal case against Harvey Weinstein, Justice James M. Burke of the New 
York County Supreme Court ruled that the defense and prosecution should refrain from 
speaking about the witnesses to the media—but he denied a gag order to the same effect for 
Gloria Allred, the attorney for the three victims. See id.  Justice Burke said he did not have the 
authority to grant the gag order. See id.  When asked about public commentary by the defense 
and prosecution, Allred said, “I don’t think the prosecution should do it.  I can do it because 
I’m a private attorney.” Id.  Allred’s statements suggest that she likely would not consider 
Rule 3.6 to limit her ability to speak freely to the press. 
 222. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 868.  Thus, if a victim is speaking to the press and 
helping the prosecution’s case, the defense counsel should have the right to counter these 
statements. See id.  Anything less would lead to precisely the sort of bias that Rule 3.6 seeks 
to avoid, especially if the victim’s lawyer is not barred from making prejudicial statements 
that speak to the defendant’s guilt or potentially reveal evidence that would not otherwise 
make it to trial. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 5(4)–(5). 
 223. See supra notes 35–39, 206–08 and accompanying text. 
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Although a nonparty, victims now have certain procedural rights, 
enforceable in court, granted by both the CVRA and its state counterparts.224  
As such, if participation were limited to only parties, the victim’s lawyer 
would be excluded from Rule 3.6’s strictures.  Rule 3.6, however, does not 
explicitly limit its reach to parties,225 so participation is not as easily 
delineated.  Since the ABA could have limited the Rule to parties,226 this 
conscious choice might suggest that the ABA sought to cover a greater range 
of lawyers within the Rule’s scope.227  Accordingly, determining 
participation warrants a deeper look into the victim’s role—and consequently 
the victim’s lawyer’s role—in the proceeding.  The Rule’s text is unclear 
regarding what being a participant means:  whether the attorney is a 
participant solely by virtue of representing a participant or if the attorney 
must actively participate.228  Yet it is even less clear when the victim’s 
attorney is simply representing a victim; then the question might be whether 
the victim is a participant.229 
Victims in the proceeding are “passive actors in supporting roles,”230 as 
the prosecutor dictates the victim’s participation in the trial.231  At the early 
stages of the proceeding, the victim’s role is largely defined by whether the 
victim chooses to report the crime and then whether the prosecutor chooses 
to make a formal charging decision.232  Victims rarely have much input on 
charging decisions, as this is seen to be uniquely within the purview of the 
prosecutor.233 
Still, despite being nonparties, victims are not entirely foreclosed from 
participating during the criminal trial.  For instance, victims could be 
considered participants as they are often called upon to be witnesses in the 
proceeding.234  Moreover, even if the victim does not wish to testify, the 
victim may be compelled to do so, thus confirming an important and 
 
 224. See supra notes 101–14 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 226. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4.  Model Rule 3.4 is titled “Fairness 
to Opposing Party & Counsel.” Id.  Its text limits the lawyer’s obstruction of another “party’s” 
access to evidence. Id. r. 3.4(a).  Model Rule 4.2, in restricting contact, previously limited its 
language to “parties” but was later changed to “persons” to cover those who were not named 
parties to the formal suit yet still retained counsel. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & 
Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (noting the ABA’s disagreement with case law that 
suggested Rule 4.2 applied only to named parties in formal proceedings). 
 227. This would appear to comport with the goals of limiting trial publicity and Rule 3.6 at 
large. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 228. See supra Part II.A.1.  But see NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 197, at 1 
(arguing that even with limited involvement, victims’ attorneys are covered by the Rule). 
 229. See NAT’L CRIME VICTIM L. INST., supra note 197, at 1–2 (stating that the 1994 
revisions to Rule 3.6 were intended to bring it into compliance with Gentile and “the language 
in Gentile is generally applicable to speech by any attorney representing any trial participant”). 
 230. Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 327. 
 231. See id. at 327–28. 
 232. See id. at 316–17. 
 233. See id.  While prosecutors can defer to victims, and indeed are required to confer with 
victims about plea agreements under the CVRA, the prosecutor still retains discretion. See 
generally id. 
 234. See id. at 312 n.81. 
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somewhat consistent level of participation.235  Victims who wish to avoid 
testifying are left in an uncomfortable position, as victims may be brought 
into the trial against their will.236 
Similarly, victims often exercise their chance to make their voices heard 
by submitting an impact statement.237  Victims have the right to submit their 
statements, either in writing or orally, prior to the sentencing.238  These 
statements are perceived to help inform the sentencing authority about how 
the victim has been impacted by the crime.239  However, impact statements 
are often submitted after the defendant has already been convicted,240 so 
submitting the impact statement appears to have little effect on the actual trial 
outcome.241  In that sense, the victim appears to have little input prior to the 
conviction.242  In fact, the sentencing stage of the proceeding might be when 
victims participate the most and also when victims have the greatest chance 
to tell their stories in their own words.243 
Still, even if this participation comes after the trial is over, the statement’s 
influence on the sentencing could not be understated.  For example, in the 
case against Lawrence G. Nassar—a former doctor for the U.S. Women’s 
Artistic Gymnastics National Team who was sentenced to forty to 175 years 
 
 235. See id. at 313–14 (explaining that the prosecutor can subpoena a victim to testify and 
threaten the victim with jail time if the victim ignores the subpoena). 
 236. See id. 
 237. The CVRA explicitly provides victims with the right to be reasonably heard at any 
public proceeding involving sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4).  The Supreme Court has 
held that victim impact evidence is not barred by the Eighth Amendment, even in cases 
involving a capital sentencing jury. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).  In his 
concurrence, Justice Antonin Scalia explicitly invoked the victims’ rights movement. See id. 
at 834 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that case precedent barring such statements conflicted 
with “a public sense of justice” that has found its voice in the victims’ rights movement). 
 238. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016–17 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that victims have the right to be heard under the CVRA and thus may 
choose to speak at the sentencing proceeding, as opposed to only submitting a written 
statement). 
 239. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 825 (explaining that “[v]ictim impact evidence is simply 
another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused 
by the crime in question”).  But see Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 328 (noting that the 
impact statement allows victims to attempt to influence the sentence). 
 240. Impact statements are presented at sentencing—after the defendant has been found 
guilty. See generally Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 611, 611 (2009). 
 241. See id. (noting that victim impact statements “promote justice without interfering with 
any legitimate interests of criminal defendants” and without “unfairly prejudicing defendants 
in any tangible way”).  Moreover, victim impact statements might not even have any effect on 
sentencing. See id. at 634–36 (highlighting various studies that suggest that victim impact 
statements have no effect on sentence severity). 
 242. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 327–28. 
 243. See Jamie Balson, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:  Facilitating Healing in Crime Victims, 
6 PHX. L. REV. 1017, 1031 (2013) (“[T]he primary function of a victim impact statement has 
been expressive or therapeutic; to provide crime victims with a voice regardless of the impact 
it may have on the sentence itself.” (footnote omitted)).  But see Elizabeth E. Joh, Narrating 
Pain:  The Problem with Victim Impact Statements, 10 C. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 17, 25 (2000) 
(“Because the victim impact statement offers an account of grief that can neither be challenged 
nor verified, even its most eloquent defenses fail to convince.”). 
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in state prison after pleading guilty to sexually abusing seven female 
gymnasts244—Judge Rosemarie Aquilina allowed over one hundred victims 
to speak out about the impact Nassar’s abuse had on them.245  When the 
victim impact statements, particularly in such a large volume, are broadcast 
online or discussed repeatedly in the media, the sentencing panel could be 
influenced by the public’s horror at the victims’ suffering—this, however, 
might not be what Rule 3.6 is concerned with.246  Thus, although the right to 
be heard undoubtedly reflects a level of participation granted to the victim,247 
the victim’s actions at the sentencing proceeding may not necessarily make 
the victim a participant for purposes of Rule 3.6, especially when sentencing 
proceedings are open to many victims.248 
Finally, the victim is undoubtedly the subject of the trial.  It is worth 
considering whether the victim could be a full participant solely by virtue of 
being the subject of the discussion, even if the victim does not meaningfully 
participate or plan to.  On the one hand, the victim, as a subject of the 
discussion, appears central to the case.  On the other hand, the victim’s 
importance in the case falls to the side during the trial, as all focus shifts to 
the defendant and determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence.249  A court 
may venture into restricting permissible speech if it were to restrict the 
speech of those who are merely the subject of the proceeding.  Indeed, if the 
victim is only the subject of the discussion, then the victim’s attorney’s 
statements are closer to those of a commentator, rather than a participant—
and so, the statements cannot be restricted by Rule 3.6.250 
As this section makes clear, there are strong arguments for applying Rule 
3.6 when the victim’s lawyer actually participates in the criminal trial, along 
with equally strong arguments for not applying the Rule when neither the 
victim nor the victim’s lawyer participates in any meaningful way during the 
actual course of the trial.  Yet, in all of these contexts, the Rule’s scope is 
uncertain.  Thus, as examined in Part II.B, looking to the criminal justice 
policies behind victims’ rights, there are strong arguments for exempting 
 
 244. See Scott Cacciola & Victor Mather, Larry Nassar Sentencing:  ‘I Just Signed Your 
Death Warrant,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/sports/ 
larry-nassar-sentencing.html [https://perma.cc/AC86-ZXT4]. 
 245. See Scott Cacciola, Victims in Larry Nassar Abuse Case Find a Fierce Advocate:  The 
Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/23/sports/larry-nassar-
rosemarie-aquilina-judge.html [https://perma.cc/547Y-A4AD]. 
 246. Rule 3.6 appears primarily concerned with jury trials. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. 
CONDUCT r. 3.6 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  The comments note that nonjury hearings are 
less likely to be affected by prejudicial statements. See id. at cmt. 6.  Further, the sentencing 
stage occurs after the defendant has either pleaded guilty or has been convicted at trial, long 
after the “litigation of a matter.” Id. r. 3.6(a). 
 247. See Kenna v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 435 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 248. See generally Rajini Vaidyanathan & Roland Hughes, Larry Nassar Case:  The 156 
Women Who Confronted a Predator, BBC NEWS (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-us-canada-42725339 [https://perma.cc/EAP6-R5D7]. 
 249. The defendant is on trial, and so the focus falls on them, while the victim falls into a 
passive role that is scripted and limited. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 308. 
 250. See Chemerinsky & Levenson, supra note 208, at 1315–16. 
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victims’ lawyers from the Rule’s scope altogether, without regard to their 
participatory status and notwithstanding their ability to make statements that 
are materially prejudicial to the criminal proceeding. 
B.  Policy Concerns Underlying the Victims’ Rights Movement and 
Legislation 
As noted above, Rule 3.6’s text does not clearly indicate whether victims’ 
lawyers must abide by the Rule when the lawyers make extrajudicial 
statements.  Similarly, the Rule’s underlying purpose provides limited insight 
about the Rule’s application to victims’ lawyers.  The Model Rules only offer 
guidance and can be interpreted during disciplinary proceedings by courts in 
different manners.251  Thus, the application of the Model Rules depends on 
the interpretation of the text by the disciplinary body, which has authority to 
give weight to broad policy considerations beyond those of the Rule’s 
drafters.252  Drawing upon this understanding of the Model Rules, this 
section considers the various policy concerns underlying the victims’ rights 
movement and related legislation and explains how such concerns might 
affect the application of Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers. 
1.  Helping Victims’ Lawyers Be Effective Advocates 
Limiting Rule 3.6’s applicability to victims’ lawyers could enable them to 
be better advocates for their clients.253  The Model Rules are clear about 
lawyers’ duty to advocate zealously on behalf of their clients.254  As the 
modern-day trial extends beyond the courtroom walls,255 it becomes more 
important to ask whether advocating zealously on behalf of a client requires 
a lawyer to engage in extrajudicial commentary.256  At least one scholar has 
argued that attorneys may be obligated to engage in so-called “litigation 
public relations” when circumstances and customs might create an implied 
contract for such services.257  Some victims might not wish to speak to the 
media on their own and might retain attorneys to assist with managing the 
 
 251. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. & scope 14. 
 252. Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Grievance Committee:  On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 
55 BROOK. L. REV. 485, 558 (1989) (arguing that courts do not have to interpret unclear Model 
Rules to carry out the drafter’s intent, but rather “[c]onsistent with their traditional authority 
to regulate the bar, courts can and should act as policy-makers when they interpret ambiguous 
provisions”). 
 253. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 867 (arguing that lawyers may be 
required to make statements to the press to effectively represent their clients). 
 254. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client’s behalf.”). 
 255. See Howard, supra note 28, at 63–64 (examining the media’s role in trials). 
 256. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 868 (“[A] lawyer who is zealously representing a 
client, at times, should be making statements to the media.”). 
 257. John C. Watson, Litigation Public Relations:  The Lawyers’ Duty to Balance News 
Coverage of Their Clients, 7 COMMC’N L. & POL’Y 77, 101 (2002) (“By custom, contract and 
existing law there appears to be grounds for courts and bar associations to require attorneys to 
serve their clients’ interests in the court of public opinion as well as the courts of law.”). 
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press.258  Thus, much like defense attorneys advocating for their clients and 
navigating the media on their behalf, victims’ lawyers seem to have a similar 
duty.259 
Under this argument, victims are often limited in their ability to speak in 
the courtroom,260 so victims’ lawyers should have the ability to speak on their 
clients’ behalf in the “court of public opinion” and help their clients achieve 
their voices there.261  The very nature of the criminal trial and the two-party 
adversary system presupposes that both the prosecution and defense go 
head-to-head and present their cases and versions of the overall story.262  Lost 
in this battle is the victim, whose story is typically shaped by the prosecution 
in setting up its case and by the media eagerly reporting on each detail as it 
emerges.263  However, as noted earlier, the prosecutor does not represent the 
victim and likely does not consider the victim’s interests in presenting the 
story to the court and to the media.264  And, although media outlets may 
empathize with a victim’s story, the media’s goal is attracting viewership,265 
and the story that sells might not necessarily comport with the victim’s actual 
story and interests.  If Rule 3.6 were to prevent victims’ privately retained 
lawyers from speaking to the media on behalf of their clients, it could quash 
much of the attorneys’ ability to advocate for the victims, especially when 
they were retained for that very purpose. 
2.  Preserving the Right to Be Heard 
Keeping victims’ lawyers out of Rule 3.6’s scope could comport with the 
goal of victims’ rights laws and would protect the victims’ interest in having 
a voice, and thus, autonomy.266  Every client has a particular interest in the 
trial, and victims especially have an interest, tied to the CVRA, in having a 
voice and being heard.267  Thus, victims may have a specialized interest in 
 
 258. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 259. See Gregg, supra note 55, at 1329 (“Lawyers’ speech can often serve an essential 
function, and denying a lawyer access to the media can result in substantial injustice.  Lawyers 
owe a duty of zealousness to their clients and should not be denied an avenue to advocate their 
clients’ causes without strong reason.”). 
 260. Although the victim is called as a witness, the victim’s testimony is often scripted. See 
generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 317.  The other two ways the CVRA gives the 
victim the right to be heard—in plea discussions and at sentencing—occur outside the actual 
trial. See Cassell & Joffee, supra note 101, at 167. 
 261. Fulstone, supra note 186, at 662 (“The need for an attorney to speak out in the ‘court 
of public opinion’ to protect his client . . . may at times become paramount to the possibility 
of prejudicing an upcoming trial.”). 
 262. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 350. 
 263. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 317. 
 264. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text; see also Bazelon & Green, supra note 
16, at 310 n.76, 317. 
 265. See Howard, supra note 28, at 62. 
 266. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 297 (noting that the traditional 
“adversary process denies victims autonomy and puts them at risk of further psychological 
harm and invasion of privacy”). 
 267. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4) (noting that victims have the right to be heard at public 
proceedings); see also 150 CONG. REC. 22,952 (2004) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (“This bill 
intends for this right to be heard to be an independent right of the victim.”).  Although the 
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seeking lawyers to help give them a voice, not only in the courtroom but also 
outside it.268  Victims’ stories are often manipulated and shaped by the 
prosecution and defense counsel when they build their own cases-in-chief or 
defenses,269 and this story is then retold by the media, which may have its 
own agenda and goals in reporting on the story.270  Particularly in today’s 
climate, in which the media plays a large role in disseminating information 
about cases,271 victims may not wish to take a back seat and face secondary 
victimization as their stories are retold and manipulated by the media.  If the 
victims do not wish to speak to the media on their own, speaking through the 
lawyer could be their only opportunity to tell their stories from their 
perspective and to have their unique voices heard by the public.272 
3.  Protecting Victims’ Dignity and Privacy 
Limiting Rule 3.6’s scope could foster the goals of victims’ rights laws by 
helping victims’ attorneys preserve their clients’ dignity and privacy in 
public.  Notably, the CVRA reflected an adoption of these interests when the 
CVRA granted victims the explicit right to be treated with fairness and with 
respect for their dignity and privacy.273  However, outside the trial and 
especially in high-profile cases, victims’ attorneys could seek to preserve 
victims’ dignity within the media.274  For example, in cases of sexual assault, 
the victims’ mental or physical state at the time of the assault becomes the 
focus of intense scrutiny.275  The defense may seek to blame the victim and 
may do so through extrajudicial commentary.276  Moreover, even if the 
defense counsel does not seek to use such a defense, the media may inquire 
into the backstory on its own.277  Therefore, victims’ lawyers might need to 
engage in pretrial publicity to protect their clients and the clients’ rights. 
 
CVRA is limited to only public proceedings, it reflects a victim’s broader interest in having a 
voice, regardless of the procedural merits of such statements. See generally supra notes 237–
43 and accompanying text.  Thus, even though the CVRA does not endorse extrajudicial 
statements on behalf of victims, it does tacitly endorse the victim’s interest in being heard. 
 268. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 318 (noting that “victims are on 
their own” but that it is “axiomatic that individuals with legal rights need lawyers”). 
 269. See id. at 295 (“In the rare case where there is a trial, the victim’s narrative is shaped 
by the prosecutor, the victim must undergo cross-examination by the defense attorney, and the 
matter of punishment is up to the judge.”). 
 270. See Howard, supra note 28, at 62. 
 271. See id. at 61–62. 
 272. See generally Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 312 (“[The victim] didn’t want 
someone else deciding where and how her story would be told—and certainly not in court, in 
response to lawyers’ questions, piecemeal, confined by rules of evidence, punctuated by 
objections.  The victim wanted an empathetic audience . . . .”). 
 273. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8). 
 274. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 869 (arguing that “at times attorneys must speak 
out to protect their clients’ reputations”). 
 275. See Pizzi, supra note 16, at 355.  The defense may attempt to suggest that the victim 
is lying or has ulterior motives. See id. 
 276. See, e.g., supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 277. See Howard, supra note 28, at 62. 
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4.  Considering the Efficacy of Rule 3.6 
Rule 3.6 might not be an effective method of limiting trial publicity,278 and 
if this is so, then victims’ attorneys should not be hindered in their advocacy 
efforts by it.279  For instance, there is little evidence that juries are actually 
influenced by pretrial publicity and similarly little evidence to suggest that 
lawyers’ extrajudicial statements pose a particular threat when such 
statements are just a fraction of the general media stories.280  And, since Rule 
3.6 only bars those statements that the lawyer should reasonably know are 
prejudicial, one scholar has argued that the Rule places a burden on the 
attorney to resolve situations when statements might be materially 
prejudicial—leaving the attorney at the mercy of the disciplinary board, 
which may or may not share the attorney’s view.281 
Similarly, some scholars have argued that Rule 3.6 presents a weak attempt 
at preventing juror bias pretrial—one that is not necessary and is 
overreaching.282  At least one scholar has argued that jurors should not be 
treated like they are incapable of filtering information and logically weighing 
evidence.283  Keeping jurors in a vacuum, the argument goes, does little to 
preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.284  Taking this argument to heart, 
it might be reasonable to allow victims’ lawyers to advocate on behalf of 
their clients where the rule barring extrajudicial statements may do little to 
preserve the sanctity of the jurors anyway.285  Regardless of pretrial 
publicity, jurors come to the trial with inherent biases and assumptions,286 
and there are procedural safeguards, such as voir dire, to ensure a jury pool 
is not entirely biased coming into the trial.287  Similarly, tailored gag orders 
imposed on a case-by-case basis could be less imposing, while still allowing 
 
 278. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.  This is especially so in high-profile 
cases, where “[e]ven if no attorney or participant in the case ever spoke to the media, there 
would still be intense coverage.” Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 869. 
 279. In cases with extensive publicity, it is unclear that additional statements by the lawyer 
would make any difference. See Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 869. 
 280. See Gregg, supra note 55, at 1365. 
 281. See id. at 1366. 
 282. See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 54, at 501 (“Restricting attorney speech is not necessary 
to ensure a fair jury verdict, because keeping jurors in a vacuum is not a viable option to 
preserve a defendant’s right to a fair trial.”); see also Joel H. Swift, Model Rule 3.6:  An 
Unconstitutional Regulation of Defense Attorney Trial Publicity, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1003, 1053–
54 (1984) (arguing that Rule 3.6 is a harmful form of prior censorship). 
 283. See Kelly, supra note 54, at 501–02. 
 284. See id. 
 285. See generally id. at 501 (“An attorney is paid . . . by his client . . . to advocate his 
client’s position, and preventing a lawyer from voicing his views does little to preserve jury 
impartiality.”). 
 286. See id. at 501–02. 
 287. See id.  But see Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1075 (1991) (noting that 
even if such safeguards could ensure a fair trial, they entail “serious costs to the system” and 
may not be entirely effective). 
2021] WHO TELLS THEIR STORIES? 1349 
the judge to take appropriate measures where particular statements are 
inappropriate.288 
Accordingly, as evidenced above, the policies guiding the victims’ rights 
movement, related legislation, and Rule 3.6 itself could provide some 
guidance in interpreting the Rule’s application to victims’ lawyers, where 
neither the text itself, nor its purpose, sheds any light on the matter. 
III.  BEYOND THE TEXT:  GIVING VICTIMS THEIR VOICE 
This Note argues that Rule 3.6, as it is currently written, should not apply 
to victims’ lawyers.  The text of the Rule is ambiguous.  And, although the 
purpose behind Rule 3.6 might support limiting victims’ lawyers’ 
extrajudicial statements, as Part III.A notes, the policy concerns underlying 
the victims’ rights movement do not support such an interpretation.  
Therefore, as examined in Part III.B, the Rule should not apply to victims’ 
attorneys. 
Further, as proposed in Part III.C, the CVRA and other state legislation 
should be modified to affirmatively grant victims the right to have counsel 
speak extrajudicially on their behalf.  Finally, as this Note concludes in Part 
III.D, the Model Rules should be amended to consider victims’ attorneys, 
who hold a unique position in criminal trials.  Such modifications will 
prevent further confusion about the application of the Model Rules to this 
growing body of attorneys. 
A.  Victims’ Lawyers Should Be Permitted to Advocate for Their Clients’ 
Interests 
The victims’ rights movement seeks to give victims a voice in criminal 
proceedings.  Reflecting the goals of this movement, the CVRA established 
several rights for victims throughout the trial process.289  However, these 
enumerated rights did not make victims parties, nor did they give victims the 
ability to tell their stories in their own words during the trial.290  Thus, 
victims’ lawyers should be allowed to speak publicly on behalf of their 
clients.  Both the limited participatory status of victims under victims’ rights 
laws and the goals of these laws support victims’ lawyers being permitted to 
publicly advocate for their clients. 
1.  Victims’ Rights Laws Limit the Victim’s Ability to Participate 
Rule 3.6 is limited to lawyers who are participating in the proceeding.291  
Although not limited to parties, the Rule’s text does appear to be somewhat 
limited, since it does not apply to all lawyers.  The Rule’s text, in its current 
 
 288. See Gregg, supra note 55, at 1363–64.  Gag orders may be preferable to Rule 3.6, as 
they can be narrowly tailored to the specific case circumstances. See id. at 1364. 
 289. See supra notes 108–14 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra notes 120–24, 179 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 
138–40. 
 291. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
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form, does not define what it means for a lawyer to participate in legal 
proceedings—specifically, whether active participation in the proceeding is 
required or if representing a participant is sufficient.292  Regardless, under 
either interpretation, the victim would not be a full participant for purposes 
of the Rule. 
Under the first interpretation, victims’ lawyers would rarely be true 
participants in the proceeding.  The CVRA reflects Congress’s careful 
considerations about which rights ought to be afforded to victims in criminal 
proceedings.  Yet, those participatory rights are inherently tied to the 
CVRA.293  Under a rigid interpretation of participation, the victim’s lawyer 
would be incredibly limited in the ability to appear in court on behalf of the 
victim—indeed, the lawyer would only appear to enforce the rights of the 
victim if they were infringed.294  Otherwise, the lawyer would merely be 
present but would likely not be actively participating. 
Under the second interpretation of participation, the victim’s lawyer is 
similarly not a participant, since the lawyer does not represent a true 
participant.  Despite all of the substantive rights afforded by the CVRA and 
the interests that have been acknowledged, the CVRA did not transform 
victims into formal parties to the proceeding.295  By giving victims only 
certain procedural rights but withholding party status, Congress kept victims 
at the boundaries of the criminal trial.  Accordingly, victims are not true 
participants in the same way that the defendant or the government is.  Instead, 
the victim is a moving figure—at times central to the particular procedural 
checkpoint in the trial and, at others, a bystander with large interests at 
stake.296 
Victims are still passive actors in the criminal trial, and the scope of their 
participation is severely limited and, indeed, almost entirely dictated by the 
prosecutor and various victims’ rights laws.297  The victim’s participation in 
the trial is largely limited to participating as a witness and submitting a victim 
impact statement.298  The opportunity to submit a victim impact statement is 
an important right for victims; indeed, it affords victims the ability to 
confront defendants, tell their stories, and begin to heal.299  But, as noted 
earlier, victim impact statements are submitted after the trial has already 
ended.300  Any impact that the victim’s words have is limited at that point.  
Even in cases in which multiple victims submit victim impact statements, 
their impact on the trial does not appear to be strong enough to deem them 
full participants.  And, although the victim is the subject of the trial, the trial 
is hardly focused on the victim alone.  Instead, the trial is almost entirely 
 
 292. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 293. See supra notes 122–24 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 106–07, 114, 136 and accompanying text. 
 295. See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 297. See Bazelon & Green, supra note 16, at 327–28. 
 298. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 299. See supra notes 237–43 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
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focused on the defendant.301  Thus, merely being the subject of the case does 
not warrant participatory status either. 
For better or for worse, the victim is still not a full participant in a criminal 
proceeding, due largely to the procedural barriers that keep the victim on the 
sidelines.302  Applying Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers’ extrajudicial statements 
runs counter to Congress’s and the states’ intents in enacting victims’ rights 
laws, as it incorrectly classifies victims and their lawyers as full participants, 
thus denying victims effective representation.  There was a legislative 
judgment to grant victims enumerated rights.  The limited participatory status 
victims currently have under the CVRA and corresponding state laws should 
not serve to limit victims from a right they would otherwise have.  Thus, a 
victim’s independent lawyer should not be restricted from making 
extrajudicial statements in the same way that a prosecutor or defense attorney 
is. 
2.  The Victim’s Interest in Having a Voice Has Been Recognized by 
Victims’ Rights Laws 
The CVRA’s provision entitling victims to the right to be heard reflects 
the underlying policies of the victims’ rights movement in giving victims a 
voice.303  Victims’ having a voice, particularly when they have traditionally 
been prevented from asserting their own stories during criminal proceedings, 
would provide great benefits.304  This important interest was acknowledged 
by the victims’ rights movement and was further echoed in the enactment of 
the CVRA.305 
While victims have traditionally been kept silent, except for scripted 
testimony, the CVRA acknowledges the importance of victims’ participatory 
rights,306 which, in turn, helps victims avoid retraumatization and ensures 
their satisfaction with the criminal process.307  And, though the CVRA does 
not specify whether the victim has an enumerated right to be heard before or 
after charges are brought, the mere existence of such a right suggests the 
CVRA acknowledges the importance of listening to victims and ensuring 
they feel recognized.308  Thus, this goal should be furthered by 
acknowledging the duty victims’ lawyers have to speak on behalf of their 
clients outside of the courtroom. 
 
 301. See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
 302. Although an examination of the sufficiency of the CVRA’s approach to victims is 
beyond the scope of this Note, this approach, including the rights not granted to victims, speaks 
to the victim’s role in the criminal trial. 
 303. See supra notes 150–54 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 96–100 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 118–19, 126–27 and accompanying text. 
 307. See generally supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Rule 3.6 Should Not Apply to Victims’ Lawyers 
Reflecting both the interests of victims and the limited participation they 
are afforded by victims’ rights laws, Rule 3.6 should not apply to victims’ 
lawyers.  While Rule 3.6’s concern of protecting the defendant’s right to a 
fair trial is important, the importance of progressing victims’ rights 
overwhelms the few documented benefits of Rule 3.6. 
1.  Victims’ Attorneys Are Not Participating Attorneys 
Rule 3.6 is limited to participants in the criminal trial.309  It is evident that 
victims’ attorneys have limited rights to participate during the criminal trial; 
participation is limited to enforcing victims’ statutory rights, rather than 
focusing on the trial itself.310  Even if a victim’s attorney is participating by 
virtue of representing a participant, as noted above, it is unclear when, if at 
all, victims are true participants in the criminal trial.311  Indeed, tying 
application of Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers based on victim participation 
raises timing issues.  The victim is not a participant at the start of the trial, 
which limits the two parties to the state and the defendant.  This raises 
numerous questions:  When are victims participants?  Do victims become 
participants when they testify or speak at a plea bargaining proceeding?  Can 
victims be participants to the criminal trial when speaking at sentencing, 
which occurs after the defendant has already been convicted?  Further, if the 
victims’ participation is tied to their testimonies, do they stop being 
participants after they leave the stand?  Moreover, does limiting the victims’ 
participation limit the reach that their attorneys’ extrajudicial commentary 
has? 
Viewing victims as participants raises these questions.  Indeed, it is unfair 
to suggest that victims are participants for the duration of the trial in the same 
sense that the prosecution and defendant are.  On the other hand, it is difficult 
to delineate when victims are true participants and how this ought to factor 
into an analysis under Rule 3.6.  Yet, by making victims nonparticipants for 
the application of Rule 3.6, these concerns can be avoided.  Given that there 
is no evidence that the Model Rule drafters had contemplated these concerns 
in drafting Rule 3.6, this approach avoids expanding the Rule beyond its 
drafters’ intentions. 
Nonetheless, even if considering victims’ limited participatory rights and 
the text of Rule 3.6’s application to participating attorneys, as discussed 
below, victims’ attorneys should not be subject to Rule 3.6 for multiple 
reasons. 
 
 309. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 310. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 311. See supra Parts II.A.3, III.A.1. 
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2.  Victims’ Interests and Their Attorneys’ Unique Roles in Criminal Trials 
Rule 3.6 should be interpreted so it does not apply to victims’ lawyers.  
Although a victim’s lawyer may make materially prejudicial statements, a 
victim’s lawyer is fundamentally different from the prosecution and defense, 
having limited opportunities to advocate on the client’s behalf inside the 
courtroom.  Defense counsel, for example, even if limited in their 
extrajudicial commentary, are still able to tell their clients’ stories inside the 
courtroom.312  Victims’ lawyers do not have the same opportunity during 
most of the trial.313  Instead, the victim’s story is shaped by the prosecution 
during direct examination and then reshaped by the defense during 
cross-examination.314  The unique position victims hold in the criminal trial 
makes it difficult for victims to proceed through the litigation with a true 
sense of agency.315  This lack of agency is exacerbated when the victim’s 
story is manipulated by the two parties and retold by the media. 
Similarly, victims’ lawyers do not have the same authority as the 
prosecution and defense, making their statements less likely to materially 
affect the proceeding.  Although victims’ lawyers have information 
pertaining to their clients, they do not have access to the prosecutor’s or 
defense’s case.316  The public is unlikely to perceive victims’ lawyers to be 
as authoritative as the lawyers representing the parties, since both the 
prosecution and defense will have access to testimony, investigatory details, 
and reports that would be inaccessible to the victim’s attorney. 
Further, applying the Rule to victims’ lawyers would harm the furtherance 
of victims’ rights.  While the Rule contains a “right to reply” provision,317 
which allows an attorney to reply to adverse commentary,318 this provision 
fails to cover the scope of extrajudicial commentary that the victim’s lawyer 
should have.  Although the language of Model Rule 3.6(c) theoretically 
allows victims’ lawyers to respond to negative publicity, under this 
provision, victims’ lawyers may only act to reduce the harm of the initial 
negative commentary.319  This carveout better suits the defendant, where 
defense counsel has to mitigate the damage caused when the jury hears 
negative information before the trial and arrives with preconceived notions 
about the defendant’s guilt.320  With victims, however, the concern is less 
 
 312. See generally supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 314. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 317. Brown, supra note 56, at 387. 
 318. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.6(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 319. See id. 
 320. This right-to-reply provision can be utilized by the defense counsel if the victim’s 
attorney’s speech harms the defendant. See generally Catherine Cupp Theisen, Comment, The 
New Model Rule 3.6:  An Old Pair of Shoes, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 837, 858 (1996) (arguing that 
this provision “will likely protect most statements defense attorneys wish to make”).  Still, 
arguments can be made for why limiting Rule 3.6’s reach with respect to victims’ attorneys 
may be harmful to defendants, irrespective of the defense’s right to reply. See generally supra 
notes 214–22 and accompanying text.  There seems to be no solution that allows victims the 
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about mitigating damage concerning a fair trial and is instead about 
preventing a victim’s story from being exploited and manipulated in the first 
place. 
Finally, Rule 3.6 faces multiple criticisms.  Because Rule 3.6 is already 
insufficiently applied to participating lawyers,321 its scope should not be 
expanded to include additional attorneys.  For instance, the Rule is poorly 
applied to prosecutors, whose extrajudicial commentary is often incredibly 
damaging but who face few consequences.322  Rule 3.6 has also been 
criticized as being ambiguous, making application difficult even in relatively 
clear-cut cases involving the participating attorneys.323  Given the Rule’s 
inconsistent application and noted ambiguity, the Rule’s reach should not be 
extended further.324 
Rule 3.6 is also likely ineffective at preventing juror bias.325  With varying 
applications of the Rule,326 extrajudicial commentary is likely to reach the 
jury regardless.  Moreover, growing media interest in criminal trials means 
that when the media writes about a case, it may be difficult to find a juror 
who has not heard of, or been affected by it, regardless of victims’ lawyers’ 
speech.327  Therefore, victims’ attorneys should not be prevented from 
speaking on behalf of their clients—in one of the only forums they can—
based on a faulty assumption that preventing this speech will help preserve 
the defendant’s right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. 
All of the foregoing reasons highlight why the interests of victims, as 
supported by victims’ rights legislation, should outweigh the concerns 
motivating Rule 3.6.  Thus, the Rule should be interpreted such that it does 
not apply to victims’ lawyers; this would protect victims by allowing their 
 
chance to make their stories heard through attorneys and defendants to have the opportunity 
for a truly unbiased jury.  However, victims are unrestricted by the Model Rules, which apply 
only to attorneys; therefore, victims would likely speak regardless of whether their attorneys 
were limited by Rule 3.6. See generally MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT pmbl. & scope.  
Moreover, there are less restrictive options for preserving jury impartiality. See supra notes 
287–88 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text. 
 324. Moreover, although not examined in depth in this Note, the Court has been careful to 
limit restrictions on attorneys’ First Amendment rights. See generally supra notes 49–52 and 
accompanying text.  Rule 3.6 and similar disciplinary rules limiting extrajudicial commentary 
are viewed as a necessary balance between protecting a defendant’s right to a fair trial and an 
attorney’s First Amendment right to speak freely. See generally Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 
501 U.S. 1030, 1071–76 (1991).  Nonetheless, such disciplinary rules have been criticized as 
overbearing restrictions on attorneys’ First Amendment rights. See supra note 53.  Expanding 
the reach of these rules to another group of attorneys would require contending with the 
victims’ attorneys’ First Amendment rights.  The Gentile Court made clear that the holding 
was not speaking to third parties. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1072 n.5.  Applying Rule 3.6 to 
victims’ attorneys raises additional constitutional concerns, especially where the attorneys are 
not participating in the same manner as the defense or prosecution.  Interpreting Rule 3.6 in a 
manner that avoids application to victims’ attorneys avoids this constitutional question. 
 325. See supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text; supra Part II.B.4. 
 326. See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text. 
 327. See generally supra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
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attorneys to zealously represent them.  The compelling interest that 
defendants have in a fair trial is unlikely to be significantly prejudiced by the 
statements of an attorney who lacks the authority of the prosecution or 
defense.  More importantly, victims’ interests will be significantly furthered 
if their attorneys are not prevented by Rule 3.6 from making extrajudicial 
statements. 
Beyond simply limiting Rule 3.6’s scope, the ABA should acknowledge 
the important interests that victims have and the powerful way that 
extrajudicial statements could help them by affirmatively amending Rule 3.6 
to reflect its nonapplication to victims’ lawyers.  Alternatively, the ABA 
should provide clear commentary to the Rule reflecting the same. 
C.  Victims’ Rights Laws Should Codify the Right to Have Counsel Speak 
Extrajudicially 
There is, of course, no guarantee that Rule 3.6 will be amended so it does 
not apply to victims’ lawyers.  However, considering the goals of the victims’ 
rights movement and current victims’ rights laws,328 the CVRA and its 
various state counterparts should be amended to provide victims an explicit 
right to have their lawyers speak publicly on their behalf.  The CVRA, which 
was meant to serve as a guide for states to amend their victims’ rights laws, 
provides only enumerated rights to victims.329  One of those rights is the right 
to be heard.330  However, there is no explicit right to be heard outside specific 
points in the proceeding, such as during plea bargaining or at sentencing.331  
And, while the CVRA affirms victims’ right to retain private counsel,332 it 
does not elaborate much further on the role of those attorneys. 
Accordingly, victims should not be limited in their ability to be heard.  The 
CVRA and other victims’ rights laws should reflect the strong interest that 
victims have in telling their stories and the possibility that victims might want 
their attorneys to tell their stories publicly on their behalf.  Enumerating the 
right to have victims’ attorneys speak on their behalf publicly will not only 
further the goal of giving victims a voice but also allow attorneys to protect 
victims’ dignity in the media.  As trials are increasingly publicized in the 
media, it is time legislatures acknowledge that, under victims’ rights laws as 
currently written, the public sphere may be the only place where the victim 
can be heard, outside the few specified points throughout the trial. 
 
 328. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 329. See supra notes 104–14 and accompanying text. 
 330. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4). 
 331. See, e.g., id. (limiting the right to be heard to public proceedings “involving release, 
plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding”). 
 332. See generally supra notes 114, 136, 143 and accompanying text. 
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D.  The Bigger Picture:  The Problem with Ambiguity in the Model Rules 
Rule 3.6 is just one example of a Model Rule geared toward participants 
or parties.333  And, the Model Rules contain no rules that refer specifically to 
victims.334  As such, the growing group of lawyers who represent nonparties 
are left with the difficult task of parsing through the language of the Model 
Rules to determine the Model Rules’ application.  As evidenced by both the 
Epstein and Maxwell cases—both of which were brought in quick succession 
and received significant media coverage335—cases may involve multiple 
victims, many of whom will retain attorneys.  Given these procedural factors, 
victims’ lawyers might not even consider whether they are covered by Rule 
3.6 or other Model Rules, as evidenced by Gloria Allred’s comments in the 
Harvey Weinstein prosecution, noting that her extrajudicial commentary was 
not barred.336 
At only seventeen years old, the CVRA’s full scope is still being 
understood.337  However, more victims are likely to retain lawyers to help 
apprise them of their rights and protect their interests.338  Thus, the ABA 
must consider this growing body of lawyers in the next iterations of the 
Model Rules.  The solution should be to amend the rules to add subsections 
addressing victims and victims’ lawyers.  Alternatively, the ABA should add 
commentary to the rules elaborating on their application to victims’ lawyers 
during criminal trials.  This approach would almost certainly remove any 
doubt about the application of the rules, without requiring any rewriting of 
the rules themselves. 
Whether the ABA amends the Model Rules, or merely adds commentary, 
there must be an acknowledgment in the rules reflecting the growing reality 
that, even within the adversary system, there are often multiple interested 
nonparties with large interests at stake, especially in criminal trials. 
CONCLUSION 
High-profile cases, sometimes with multiple victims, reveal the growing 
number of lawyers who represent victims, both to vindicate victims’ rights 
and help victims navigate the difficult experience of trial.  These attorneys 
take on multiple roles, acting as legal advisors, representatives, and 
spokespersons for victims, for many of whom the trial and the ensuing media 
chaos brings renewed trauma.  As the victims’ rights movement only 
continues to grow and victims’ lawyers begin to cement their place in the 
 
 333. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“Fairness to 
Opposing Party & Counsel”); id. r. 4.2 (governing communications about the subject of the 
representation with a person who is known to be “represented by another lawyer in the 
matter”). 
 334. See Butler, supra note 106, at 26. 
 335. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 336. See supra note 221. 
 337. See Butler, supra note 106, at 22 (“Change is often difficult.  The past course of 
dealings in criminal proceedings will continue to be what judges and practitioners know and 
expect.”). 
 338. See supra Part I.C.1. 
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traditional adversary system, victims’ lawyers will likely feel compelled, as 
advocates, to speak out on their clients’ behalf in the media with more 
frequency.  At the moment, Rule 3.6, which governs trial publicity, is unclear 
regarding its application to victims’ lawyers.  Ultimately, this Note argues 
that Rule 3.6 should not be applied to victims’ lawyers.  Finding the text of 
Rule 3.6 ambiguous and considering the policy concerns motivating the Rule 
and underlying the victims’ rights movement and laws, this Note argues that 
applying Rule 3.6 to victims’ lawyers would contravene the victims’ rights 
movement and the goals of the CVRA, which grants victims participatory 
rights but denies them full party status.  As long as victims are not traditional 
parties to the proceeding and as long as victims have limited procedural rights 
at trial, victims’ lawyers should not be subject to Rule 3.6. 
